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Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 
Takings Initiatives  
abstract.   The partial regulatory takings movement seeks to compensate private 
landowners when regulations diminish their land values. This movement has grown in recent 
years, particularly at the state level. Scholars have focused thus far on the cost of compensation 
and its effect on the regulations that governments enact or enforce. In addition to exploring 
those concerns, this Note argues that partial regulatory takings regimes threaten to constrain 
residents’ ability to influence their communities’ growth and character. The greatest impact 
could fall on low-income communities, many of which contain disproportionate levels of 
undesirable land uses and lack adequate financial resources to influence land use planning in the 
absence of regulatory solutions or alternative venues. To address these problems, state and local 
governments should implement what I call a “regulatory balances” regime, strengthening 
participatory planning venues and funding the resulting measures.  
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The United States is currently in the midst of a growing movement—at 
both the national and the state level—pursuing partial regulatory takings 
reform.1 This movement, which has emerged as a response to perceived 
government abuses, seeks to extend current Fifth Amendment takings doctrine 
to give property owners a claim to compensation whenever government 
regulation causes even slight decreases in the value of their property. One 
recent change of heart highlights the growth of this movement: in 2006, 
Arizona voters approved an initiative—the Private Property Rights Protection 
Act2—that had the same purpose of mandating compensation for partial 
regulatory takings3 as a 1992 act that Arizona voters repealed by referendum in 
1994.4 California, Idaho, and Washington saw similar initiatives on the ballot 
in 2006.5  
Government action inevitably results in gains and losses for different 
groups of people. Viewed optimistically, and under the assumption that state 
and local governments are not corrupt, the very essence of government action 
is an attempt to serve the public good.6 Whether because interest groups fight 
 
1.  See, e.g., Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives, 46 S.C. L. REV. 613, 615 
(1995) (noting that property owners are “aggressively seeking relief, passing laws that 
require prior assessment of the potential ‘takings’ implications of new rules” and 
“introducing bills that ease the litigation burden facing the state and the property owner by 
clarifying when compensable takings have occurred”); see also infra Section I.A (discussing 
the growth of state initiatives and legislation).  
2.  Proposition 207 (Ariz. 2006) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1131 to -1138), available 
at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-
2006).pdf. 
3.  Id. sec. 3, § 12-1134(A). 
4.  See Private Property Rights Protection Act, 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 369 (repealed 1994); 
Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 537 
(2000) (discussing the 1994 repeal); R. Andrew Branan, Raising Arizona: How Campaign 
Message Discipline Extinguished the First Flames of the Property Rights Prairie Fire, CAMPAIGNS 
& ELECTIONS, June 1995, at 36, 36, 39 (discussing the defeat, by 60% of the vote, of the 1994 
proposition to retain the law). 
5.  Proposition 90 (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_ 
text.pdf; Proposition 2 (Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ 
elect/inits/06init08.htm; Initiative Measure No. 933 (Wash. 2006), available at 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf.  
6.  This Note views government action as falling somewhere between the public interest and 
public choice models of government. Government action attempts to achieve “public or 
objective values and ends for human action” through deliberation and majority rule, as well 
as to meet the conflicting, self-interested goals of influential individuals. See Frank I. 
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for legislative change7 or because legislators are committed to the public 
welfare,8 the overall effect of legislation may be one of relatively balanced gains 
and losses,9 or takings and “givings,”10 that result in some level of fairness for 
everyone. Of course, governments do not always achieve a regulatory balance.11 
Nevertheless, the partial regulatory takings solutions designed to respond 
to this mismatch, real or perceived, are too extreme—from the 2006 ballot 
initiatives and state bills to Oregon’s already costly Measure 37, which became 
effective in 2004.12 By raising regulatory costs and by failing to provide an 
alternative to regulation, the regimes could stifle government regulation and 
prevent individuals from influencing the growth and character of their 
neighborhoods—and in some cases already have. 
This Note proposes a remedy that lies between the status quo and the 
recent regulatory takings proposals. Through what I call a “regulatory 
balances” planning process, states should address the impact of state and local 
government action on private property owners, including low- and middle-
income groups. This regime would distribute regulatory burdens more evenly 
by supporting community participation in local planning processes;13 by 
 
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of 
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-49 (1977-1978). 
7.  See id. at 172 (describing the normative public choice theory that sufficient opportunity for 
interest group representation—e.g., “logrolling”—can ensure overall regulatory balance).  
8.  See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22 (2d ed. 1964) 
(stating that the aim of society is to “maximize . . . social utility or social welfare”); see also 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (finding that 
government actions for the public good, such as a public program “adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good,” are less likely to be considered 
takings under the Fifth Amendment). 
9.  See, e.g., C. FORD RUNGE ET AL., LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
AFFECTING LAND AND PROPERTY VALUES: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF TAKINGS AND GIVINGS 24 
(1996) (“[G]overnment actions affect land and property values every day, in myriad ways, 
both positively and negatively.”). 
10.  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549-50 (2001). 
11.  See, e.g., id. at 550, 554; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 210 (1985) (noting that if each regulation results in a loss, the 
combination of regulations only can result in “a larger negative sum”). 
12.  As of April 12, 2007, landowners in Oregon had filed claims totaling approximately $15 
billion. Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., DLCD Measure 37, Summaries of Claims, 
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE37/summaries_of_claims.shtml (last visited Apr. 
24, 2007). 
13.  “Community” throughout this Note refers to a group of residents within a given planning 
area, whether a neighborhood, town, or district within a city, who care about the character 
of the area in which they live (even if only temporarily) and who are likely to call that area 
“home.” 
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funding projects that stem from this planning; and by forming institutions that 
would oversee local planning systems, answer concerns, and provide 
alternatives to property rights litigation. 
Part I describes the growing partial regulatory takings movement, analyzes 
the potential costs of this movement, and provides an overview of government 
responses to successful regulatory takings initiatives. Part II investigates the 
major flaws of both regulatory takings regimes and the status quo—including 
limitations on community planning mechanisms and greater inequities for 
communities that rely upon these mechanisms. Part III then suggests 
procedural and substantive mechanisms to address those problems. 
i. the partial regulatory takings movement  
The idea that a regulation’s diminution of private property value can result 
in a taking dates back as far as the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.14 An organized partial regulatory takings reform movement, however, 
is a recent phenomenon. This Part discusses the growth of that movement.  
A. The Rise of State Takings Reform Legislation 
Although the partial regulatory takings reform movement has grown 
through action at both the federal and state levels,15 most of the success has 
been in the states, while significant federal efforts largely have failed. In 1988, 
President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,630, which required federal 
government agencies to assess the takings implications of regulatory actions.16 
Members of Congress subsequently introduced federal regulatory takings 
legislation that would have forced the federal government to compensate 
landowners for diminished property values resulting from federal agency 
action,17 but Congress failed to approve any of the proposals. 
 
14.  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (explaining that some regulation “goes too far” and 
therefore constitutes a taking of private property). 
15.  See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 154 (2d ed. 1998) (chronicling how the movement “gained 
momentum” in state legislatures and Congress during the 1990s and was not quelled by the 
judiciary’s independent attempts to bolster private property rights). 
16.  53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8862 (Mar. 15, 1988).  
17.  E.g., Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. 
§ 13 (2005); Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(D) 
(1996); Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995); Just 
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Takings-related initiatives and legislation at the state level have been more 
successful.18 While most proposed initiatives have contained provisions 
concerning both eminent domain and regulatory takings,19 this Note focuses 
on the takings provisions.20 Regulatory takings initiatives appeared on ballots 
in Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington in 2006,21 and voters proposed 
regulatory takings measures in states such as Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and 
Oklahoma in 2005 and 2006.22 
 
Compensation Act of 1993, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. § 5(a), (c) (1993); see also Marzulla, supra 
note 1, at 630-31. 
18.  This Note defines “initiatives” as measures that appear on state ballots; it uses “legislation” 
to refer to all other proposed statutory or constitutional reforms that do not take effect 
through direct voter approval or rejection. For summaries of state legislative action, see 
Harvey M. Jacobs & Brian W. Ohm, Statutory Takings Legislation: The National Context, the 
Wisconsin and Minnesota Proposals, 2 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 184, 208-20 (1995); Marzulla, 
supra note 1, at 633-35; Michael A. Culpepper, Comment, The Strategic Alternative: How State 
Takings Statutes May Resolve the Unanswered Questions of Palazzolo, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 509 
(2002); Carl P. Marcellino, Note, The Evolution of State Takings Legislation and the Proposals 
Considered During the 1997-98 Legislative Session, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 149-69 
(1999); and Harvey M. Jacobs, The Impact of State Property Rights Laws: Those Laws and My 
Land, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1998, at 3, 3-4. 
19.  Despite the differences between eminent domain and regulatory takings, seven of the eight 
states that attempted partial regulatory takings reform in 2005 and 2006 through ballot 
measures joined the two issues in one measure. See infra notes 20-22. Although eminent 
domain has created much of the public backlash, many supporters of the regulatory takings 
movement have argued that regulatory takings are identical or strikingly similar. See infra 
notes 117-118 and accompanying text. 
20.  The regulatory takings provisions have been more contentious than those concerning 
eminent domain. See, e.g., Jeff Brady, Western Voters Consider Property Rights Changes, NPR, 
Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6102255 (quoting 
one opponent who described the takings component as the most “insidious element” of the 
initiatives, as well as a proponent who argued that the takings issue was the most important 
element of Proposition 2); Leonard C. Gilroy, The Western Property Rights Wildfire, 
REASON.ORG, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.reason.org/commentaries/gilroy_20060809.shtml 
(describing the addition of regulatory takings to eminent domain issues within the 
initiatives as a political risk, because voters widely supported eminent domain reforms but 
there was “vocal opposition” to the regulatory takings component).  
21.  Proposition 207 (Ariz. 2006) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1131 to -1138), available 
at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-
21-2006).pdf; Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(a)(1) (Cal. 2006), available at 
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf; Proposition 2 §§ 1, 4 (Idaho 2006), 
available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/06init08.htm; Initiative Measure No. 
933 §§ 1, 3 (Wash. 2006), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/ 
i933.pdf.  
22.  Constitutional Amendment to Article I Eminent Domain, 2006-34 (Mo. 2006), available at 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2006petitions/ipEminentDomainI-34.asp; Constitutional 
Amendment to Article I—Eminent Domain (Version 2), 2006-36 (Mo. 2006), available at 
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But after all of the ruckus, only Arizona’s Proposition 207 won at the ballot 
box. Courts in Oklahoma and Nevada found that the initiatives violated state 
single-subject rules.23 A Missouri court found that the fiscal note summary of 
the official ballot initiative on regulatory takings and eminent domain was 
insufficient,24 and the Montana Supreme Court struck down the state’s 
regulatory takings and eminent domain initiative based on a finding of 
unconstitutional signature collection.25 For those initiatives that reached the 
ballots, the majority of voters in California, Idaho, and Washington rejected 
them.26 Voters also rejected a local regulatory takings measure in Napa County, 
California, that preceded California’s Proposition 90.27 
The failure of several initiatives to reach ballots, as well as voters’ rejection 
of three initiatives in 2006—one of which failed by a very slim margin28—by no 
means indicates that state and local regulatory systems will remain unaffected 
in coming years. The strong base of national support to modify judicial 
interpretations of regulatory takings,29 coupled with increasing wariness about 
government control over private property and the failure of the courts to 
adequately check this control,30 continues to fuel regulatory takings reform. 
 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2006petitions/ipEminentDomainI-36.asp; Initiative No. 
154 §§ 1(2)(a), 5(1) (Mont. 2006), available at http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/archives/2006/I/I-
154.asp; Nevada Property Owners’ Bill of Rights § 1 (Nev. 2005), available at 
http://www.sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/int_ref/NvPropOwnBOR.pdf; Initiative Petition No. 
382, State Question 729 (Okla. 2005), available at http://www.sos.state.ok.us/documents/ 
questions/729.pdf. 
23.  See Nevadans for the Prot. of Prop. Rights, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1235, 1250 (Nev. 2006) 
(striking down the just compensation portion of the petition under the single-subject rule); 
In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 400, 409 (Okla. 2006). 
24.  See Crim v. Sec’y of State, No. 06AC-CC00211 (Mo. 19th Jud. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 2006); 
Petitioners Drop Appeals for Fall Ballot Measures, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Mo.), Sept. 6, 2006, 
at 2A, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/2006/Sep/20060906News026.asp. 
25.  See Montanans for Justice v. State, 146 P.3d 759, 759 (Mont. 2006). 
26.  See Bruce McPherson, Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote 76, http://www.ss.ca.gov/ 
elections/sov/2006_general/complete_sov.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2007); Sam Reed, Wash. 
Sec’y of State, 2006 General Election Results, http://vote.wa.gov/Elections/general/ 
Measures.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2007); Ben Ysursa, Idaho Sec’y of State, November 7, 
2006 General Election Results, http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/RESULTS/2006/general/ 
tot_stwd.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).  
27.  See Patrick Hoge, Losers Now Eye November, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2006, at B-5; Napa Valley 
Land Stewards Alliance, The Fair Payment for Public Benefit Act, 
http://www.landstewards.org/fairPayment/FairPayText.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). 
28.  In California, 52.4% voted no on the property rights initiative. See McPherson, supra note 
26. 
29.  See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
30.  See discussion infra Subsection I.C.1.  
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Indeed, although many local and state governments have opposed takings 
reform,31 some politicians have endorsed it.32 Republican groups in California 
and Washington supported the regulatory takings initiatives in their states, as 
did the Libertarian Party of California.33 Legislatures in Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas have passed legislation providing compensation 
opportunities for partial regulatory takings.34 Alaska,35 Georgia,36 Maine,37 
Minnesota,38 and Montana39 also have attempted unsuccessfully to implement 
regulatory takings legislation. And at least seventeen states require 
 
31.  See No on 90, We Oppose Proposition 90 the Taxpayer Trap (Nov. 6, 2006), 
http://backyard.noprop90.com/get_resource.php?table=resource_j393od_16z5x0&id=j394b
p_16o0zo (listing the California Democratic Party, the California Republican League, the 
Log Cabin Republicans, and the San Francisco Women’s Political Committee as officially 
opposing the proposition); Vote No on Proposition 207!, Endorsements (Nov. 3, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (listing at least seventeen current and former 
government officials and politicians officially opposed to Proposition 207). 
32.  See, e.g., Arizona HOPE, Please Vote YES on Prop. 207, http://www.hopeforarizona.com 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (listing under “Supporters” four U.S. Representatives, eleven 
state senators, eighteen state representatives, and two county officers). 
33.  See, e.g., Prop. Fairness Coal., Endorsements, http://www.propertyfairness.com/ 
endorsements.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (noting that the Benton-Franklin Mainstream 
Republicans officially supported the Washington initiative); Protect Our Homes Coal., 
Endorsements, http://www.90yes.com/endorsements (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (listing as 
supporters, among others, the California Congress of Republicans, the California 
Republican Party, the California Republican Assembly, the Libertarian Party of California, 
two U.S. Representatives, thirteen state senators, twenty-nine state assembly members, six 
mayors, two mayors pro tem, four county supervisors, and nine councilmembers).  
34.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3610 (2005); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 49-33-9 (1999); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.024 (Vernon 2000). 
35.  H.B. 484, 22d Leg. (Alaska 2002); see Alaska Legislature, Journal Text for HB484 in the 22nd 
Legislature (Feb. 19, 2002), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=22& 
bill=HB484&jrn=2318&hse=H (describing the last action as a committee referral). 
36.  S.R. 1040, 2005-2006 Leg. (Ga. 2006); see Ga. Gen. Assembly, SR 1040 (Oct. 11, 2006), 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2005_06/sum/sr1040.htm (describing the last action as a 
second reading). 
37.  L.D. 886, 121st Leg. (Me. 2003); see State of Me. Legislature, Summary of LD 886, 
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280009138 (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2007) (noting that the bill was declared dead on May 21, 2003). 
38.  H.F. 2773, 80th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 1998); see JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 80th Leg. Sess. 7248 
(Minn. 1998), available at http://ww3.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/1997-98/j0223078. 
htm#7248 (noting that the bill was voted to be “returned to its author”). 
39.  S.B. 397, 58th Leg. (Mont. 2003); see Mont. Legislature, Detailed Bill Information, 
http://laws.leg.mt.gov/pls/laws03/law0203w$.startup (search by “Bill Type and Number”) 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (describing the bill as “[p]robably [d]ead”). 
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governments to assess the impacts of potential takings before enacting 
legislation.40  
Furthermore, influential individuals and national libertarian organizations 
with ample resources for further reform efforts have been the strongest backers 
of the state movements in Arizona, California, and Idaho. For example, lawyers 
who drafted Oregon’s Measure 3741 helped write other states’ initiatives,42 and 
national libertarian groups such as Americans for Limited Government, Fund 
for Democracy, and America at Its Best provided millions of dollars to support 
the initiatives in Arizona, California, and Idaho.43 In Washington, state and 
county farm bureaus and individual owners of farms, dairies, and orchards 
provided approximately 59% of the funding for the failed Initiative Measure 
No. 933 (“Initiative 933”).44  
 
40.  See Oswald, supra note 4, at 542; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights 
Movement, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 1, 26-27, available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/pas/pa558.pdf (discussing “[t]akings impact assessment . . . statutes” enacted in 
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia).  
41.  Or. Sec’y of State, Measure 37, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/ 
m37_text.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). 
42.  See Telephone Interview with Tim Keller, Executive Dir., Inst. for Justice, Ariz. Chapter, in 
Tempe, Ariz. (Nov. 1, 2006). Tim Keller worked with lawyers who wrote Oregon’s Measure 
37 to draft the eminent domain portion of Arizona’s Proposition 207. See also Keith Aoki et 
al., Trading Spaces: Measure 37, MacPherson v. Department of Administrative Services, and 
Transferable Development Rights as a Path out of Deadlock, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 273, 292 
(2005) (describing how property rights groups brought the individuals behind Measure 37 
and Measure 7, a similar initiative struck down by courts following voter approval, to 
various states to assist with initiatives).  
43.  See Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Campaign Finance, http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/ 
campaign/committees/Detail.aspx?id=1283731&session=2005&view=received (last visited Apr. 
25, 2007) (displaying the significant contributions of groups such as Fund for Democracy 
and Americans for Limited Government); Jan Brewer, Ariz. Sec’y of State, Notifications of 
Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/ 
ballotmeasurenotifications.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (displaying, on pages two 
through eight, the significant contributions of groups such as Americans for Limited 
Government); Idaho Sec’y of State, Campaign Finance, Search by Candidate or Committee 
Name, http://www.sos.idaho.gov/eid/cansearc.htm (search 2006 Political Action 
Committees for contributions to “This House Is My Home”) (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) 
(showing a total of $585,000 in contributions from America at Its Best and $237,000 from 
Fund for Democracy). 
44.  See Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, Detailed Contributions, http://www.pdc.wa.gov/ 
servlet/ContServlet (search under “Candidate/Committee” for “Property Fairness 
Coalition”) (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). Americans for Limited Government contributed less 
to the campaign, approximately 30% of its total funding. See id.  
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Supporters at all levels asserted that their regulatory takings reform agenda 
would not end with the 2006 elections.45 The California Secretary of State 
already has approved the circulation of a new property rights initiative, the 
California Property Owners Protection Act.46 As one leader of Americans for 
Limited Government pledged, “Where the initiatives to . . . protect homes and 
churches have come up short, you can be sure that we’ll be back, stronger than 
before. This is a movement that will continue to grow.”47  
B. Defining Partial Regulatory Takings Regimes  
The emerging partial regulatory takings movement has several underlying 
goals. First, it focuses on regulations—particularly land use laws—that affect 
real property. Second, it broadens compensation opportunities by reducing 
substantive and procedural burdens for compensation claimants and by 
providing narrow exemptions and waivers from the compensation 
requirement. These lowered barriers result in high compensation and 
administrative costs.  
1. Targeting Land Use Regulations  
The partial regulatory takings measures that have been proposed or 
adopted primarily target laws that negatively affect owners who have real 
property and who could profit from development.48 Many of these reforms 
 
45.  See LEONARD C. GILROY, REASON FOUND., STATEWIDE REGULATORY TAKINGS REFORM: 
EXPORTING OREGON’S MEASURE 37 TO OTHER STATES (2006), http://www.reason.org/ 
ps343.pdf; Prop. Fairness Coal., Thank You!, http://www.propertyfairness.com/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (“We may not have won at the ballot box, but this fight isn’t over! 
We have set the stage for legislative efforts . . . .”). 
46.  Cmty. Rights Counsel, Here We Go Again: New Regulatory “Takings” Measures in the States, 
COMMUNITY RIGHTS REP., Jan. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.communityrights.org/ 
PDFs/Newsletters/January%202007.pdf. 
47.  Ams. for Ltd. Gov’t Found., Americans for Limited Government Win Major Victories 
Across the Nation, http://www.getliberty.org/VictoriesAcrossNation.pdf (last visited Apr. 
25, 2007) (quoting Howie Rich); see also Patrick Hoge, Eminent Domain: Supporters Plan To 
Try Again, Maybe in 2008, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2006, at A-20 (discussing Proposition 90 
supporters’ claim that Howie Rich will support future efforts at eminent domain reform).  
48.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West 2004) (private real property); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-33-9(1) (1999) (“forest or agricultural land” and its “products”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 197.352(1) (2005) (private real property); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(i) 
(Vernon 2000) (private real property); Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(A) (Ariz. 2006) (to 
be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134(A)), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/ 
2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf (private property rights). 
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have been prospective, targeting new land use regulations or advocating 
compensation requirements when governments enforce existing laws. For 
example, Arizona’s Proposition 207 allows compensation claims only for land 
use laws enacted after an owner acquires the property and after the 
proposition’s effective date.49 Idaho’s Proposition 2 contained nearly identical 
language,50 and California’s proposition applied only to laws that “damaged”51 
property after the partial regulatory takings language took effect.52 Other 
reforms, however, have contained retroactive compensation requirements. 
Washington’s Initiative 933 applied to land use regulations that existed as of 
January 1, 1996.53 Oregon’s statute requires compensation for claims based not 
only on the enactment of new regulations but also on the enforcement of any 
land use regulation enacted before the effective date.54 
Both retroactive and prospective partial regulatory takings regimes can 
restrict community planning options. Retroactive regulatory takings initiatives 
undermine governments’ ability to apply or enforce existing regulations. 
Residents purchasing property within a zoning district would have no 
guarantee that the uses within that district actually would be limited to those 
listed on a zoning map. In other words, local governments that faced high 
compensation claims when they attempted to enforce an existing zoning 
ordinance potentially would permit nonconforming uses in the area rather than 
enforce the ordinance. Prospective regulatory takings laws, by contrast, mainly 
prevent future land use planning regulation. These measures particularly affect 
areas that might need more zoning laws, such as those growing rapidly into 
previously unzoned or lightly zoned regions. 
2. Low Barriers to Claims  
In addition to targeting land use regulations, the partial regulatory takings 
regimes tend to have low barriers to claims. This Note defines partial 
regulatory takings regimes to include any laws that set lower thresholds than 
 
49.  Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(A), (B)(7). 
50.  See Proposition 2 § 4(5), (6)(e) (Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ 
elect/inits/06init08.htm. 
51.  Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(a)(8) (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/ 
pdf/prop90_text.pdf. 
52.  Id. sec. 6. 
53.  Initiative Measure No. 933 § 2(2)(b)(i) (Wash. 2006), available at 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf. 
54.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(1) (2005). 
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do the courts55 for the diminution in value sufficient to constitute a taking. For 
example, Mississippi places the compensation threshold at a 40% reduction of 
fair market value,56 Texas at 25%,57 Louisiana at 20%,58 and Oregon at any 
diminution in the fair market value of the private property.59 None of the 2006 
state initiatives articulated a precise threshold,60 thus creating the most striking 
departure from existing law. The trend in the takings reform movement has 
been toward decreasing or, most recently, eliminating the threshold values that 
trigger the right to compensation. Given the negligible or nonexistent 
threshold values in some of these states—for example, in Oregon and 
Arizona61—private property owners could make a compensation claim if a 
regulation caused a mere 0.5% decrease in the fair market value of their land. 
If the cost of pursuing a claim outweighed the amount of compensation, 
many landowners would not bother to bring actions for such small losses.62 
Most of the state initiatives and legislation, however, would impose few 
bureaucratic obstacles for compensation claimants, meaning that a staggering 
 
55.  Courts have not set a specific minimum threshold diminution of value required to find a 
taking, although they generally require either the complete destruction of “economically 
productive or beneficial uses,” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992), a 
finding of physical invasion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 421 (1982), or a taking under the Penn Central balancing test, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Some courts have suggested an actual numeric 
threshold, such as a 75% diminution in property value. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 67 
Fed. Cl. 434, 470 (2005); see also infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing the 
regulatory takings doctrine in more detail). 
56.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(h) (1999).  
57.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2000). 
58.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(11) (2005). 
59.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(2). 
60.  See Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(A) (Ariz. 2006) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
1134(A)), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/ 
PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf; Proposition 2 § 4(5) (Idaho 2006), available at 
http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/06init08.htm; Initiative Measure No. 933 § 3 
(Wash. 2006), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf. 
But see Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(b)(8) (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide. 
ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf (partially defining the threshold by requiring compensation 
for regulations that cause “substantial economic loss to private property”). 
61.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(2) (providing that any reduction in fair market value may trigger 
compensation); Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(A) (same).  
62.  Telephone Interview with Farrell Quinlan, Former Vice President, Ariz. Chamber of 
Commerce & Indus., in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 1, 2006) (arguing that landowners will not 
bother to bring a compensation action for a 10% diminution in land value). 
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number of claims could ensue if landowners with small, moderate, or large 
claims chose to follow through.63 
The remaining procedural restraints governing claims typically include 
time limitations, filing specifications, proof standards, and occasionally 
ripeness requirements. While some states such as Florida require landowners 
to enter settlement negotiations and to consider agency ripeness decisions 
before making an official compensation claim in court,64 many of the recent 
partial regulatory takings proposals—both successful and unsuccessful—only 
require landowners to make written claims to a state agency. The most 
generous provisions allow landowners to receive compensation based on a 
preenactment assumption that a law will damage property value65 or to make 
claims without submitting proof that they planned to engage in a prohibited or 
regulated use.66  
Under most regimes, landowners have sufficient (and typically ample) time 
to bring claims for compensation. Some partial regulatory takings regimes 
identify windows of time for takings actions—essentially serving as statutes of 
limitations that determine when a claim is time-barred.67 Under Arizona’s 
Proposition 207, for example, landowners have “three years [from] the 
effective date of the land use law” to bring a compensation claim.68 In Texas, 
landowners must file contested takings cases against state agencies or political 
subdivisions within 180 days after they “knew or should have known” of the 
 
63.  Although class actions could hypothetically allow the government to compensate numerous 
landowners at once, many of the claims under the proposed partial regulatory takings 
regimes require nonjudicial action and therefore do not offer mass processing options for 
claims. 
64.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(5)(a)-(b) (West 2004).  
65.  See Cal. Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(a)(1) (allowing the government to take or damage 
private property “only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to, or into the court 
for, the owner”); Wash. Initiative Measure No. 933 § 3 (requiring agencies to pay private 
property owners for damage prior to the application of regulations).  
66.  E.g., Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(D) (stating that property owners do not need to 
submit a “land use application” proving that they wish to use their land in a manner 
prevented by a regulation in order to make a demand for compensation under that 
regulation); Proposition 2 § 4(5) (Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/ 
elect/inits/06init08.htm (using identical language).  
67.  Oregon’s law requires landowners to make compensation demands within two years of the 
enforcement of the regulation or the effective date of December 2, 2004, whichever is later, 
and it requires the government to provide just compensation if the disputed regulation 
continues to apply to the property 180 days after a written demand. OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 197.352(5)-(6) (2005). Idaho proposed 120 days for owner action and ninety days for 
government payment. Idaho Proposition 2 § 4(9). 
68.  Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(G). 
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agency action’s impact on their land.69 Other regimes fail to specify any such 
limitations period. The Louisiana and Mississippi statutes, for instance, have 
no time limitations on landowner actions.70 This style of open-ended allowance 
for landowner claims confounds government planning. Absent further 
administrative or judicial interpretation,71 landowners could bring claims 
several years after the application or enforcement of government regulations, 
thus hindering governments’ ability to identify when compensation claims 
might impact future budgets and how large these claims might be.  
Additionally, some of the laws even suggest that private property can 
decrease in value at the moment the regulation is proposed.72 The failed 
initiatives in California and Washington, for example, would have required 
compensation to property owners before the government enacted or enforced a 
regulation that purportedly would diminish property values.73 The 
“preemptive payment” requirements are problematic because it is difficult to 
determine, before the enactment and application of a regulation, how property 
values will change.74 A regulation requiring an owner to maintain a portion of 
her land in open space may decrease her land value immediately, but the land 
values of the entire neighborhood (and the long-term value of the owner’s 
land) may rise because of the attractive open space and the greater scarcity of 
land created by the regulation.75 
In a similar vein, under several statutes and initiatives, compensation 
claimants need not submit proof that they intended to use their land in a 
manner barred or limited by a regulation.76 Thus, the speculative claims for 
 
69.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.021(b), .022(b) (Vernon 2000). 
70.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3610(A)-(B), (D) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-9(1) (1999).  
71.  Courts, for example, may apply parallel statutes of limitations. 
72.  By contrast, current Takings Clause doctrine does not require compensation either before 
the enactment or application of regulations that have the potential to damage land or before 
actual physical invasion. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 
(1990). 
73.  See supra note 65. 
74.  See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 10 (1974) (“As is true in most zoning cases, 
the precise impact on value may, at the threshold of litigation over validity, not yet be 
known.”). 
75.  See, e.g., William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36 ENVTL. 
L. 105, 112-14 (2006) (discussing the “amenity effects” of land use regulations); Edward J. 
Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37, 36 ENVTL. L. 131, 140 (2006) (“[I]t is by no 
means a certainty that land-use regulations reduce market land values.”).  
76.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(7) (2005) (“[N]or shall the failure of an owner of property to file 
an application for a land use permit . . . serve as grounds for dismissal, abatement, or delay 
of a compensation claim . . . .”); Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(D) (Ariz. 2006) (to be 
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just compensation under a partial regulatory takings regime would require a 
great deal of guesswork—a cost that state governments would bear.  
3. High Resulting Costs  
As discussed in Subsection 2, low procedural barriers to regulatory takings 
claims allow large numbers of potential claims. This creates high 
administrative costs for governments and delays the processing of claims, 
which detracts from the benefits offered by the compensation system.  
Oregon’s partial regulatory takings regime is a case in point. Under 
Measure 37, property owners have two years to bring claims after a regulation 
has been enacted or enforced, and they need not submit an application for a 
land use permit when they request compensation.77 Additionally, to trigger the 
compensation review process, claimants only need to make a “written demand 
for compensation . . . to the public entity enacting or enforcing the land use 
regulation.”78 The sheer number of claims under any system similar to 
Oregon’s may force governments to waive the application of most regulations 
rather than to compensate claimants or challenge questionable claims. As of 
April 12, 2007, property owners had filed a total of 6680 claims totaling 
approximately $15 billion.79 And as of March 2006 (the most recent date 
available), county and state governments receiving these claims had waived—
rather than paid—all uncontested damages claims.80  
Although Florida has not maintained regular records of claims and claim 
costs, preliminary data suggest that Florida’s Private Property Rights Act also 
has inspired expensive compensation claims. In 2003, Miami-Dade County 
 
codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134(D)), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/ 
2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf; Proposition 2 § 4(5) 
(Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/06init08.htm. 
77.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(5). 
78.  Id. § 197.352(4). 
79.  Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., supra note 12. Oregon’s Measure 37 went into effect 
on December 2, 2004. On October 14, 2005, the Marion County Circuit Court found the 
measure to be invalid, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed this decision. MacPherson v. 
Dep’t of Admin. Servs., No. 05C10444, slip op. at 23 (Marion County, Or., Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 
2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37.pdf, rev’d, 130 
P.3d 308 (Or. 2006). The court’s decision became effective on March 13, 2006. Sheila A. 
Martin, Measure 37 in Oregon: A Status Report 2 (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.pdx.edu/ 
media/i/m/ims_M37pptJan07.pdf. In the four months between the two court decisions, 
landowners still filed claims against counties but not against the state. 
80.  Steven W. Abel, Stoel Rives LLP, Presentation on Oregon Ballot Measure 37 (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://www.stoel.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=1826 (noting that each claim to date has 
been contested or waived).  
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alone faced as many as 258 claims under the Act,81 and by June 23, 1998, 
developer claims relating to floor-to-area ratio (the allowed height of a 
building based on the plot size where the building is located) and to unit bonus 
reductions totaled nearly $40 million.82 These claims have concluded in a 
variety of ways. One, for example, resulted in a settlement involving partial 
waiver of development restrictions imposed by a local referendum,83 while 
another led to discussions for cash settlement between the government and the 
property owner.84 
 In addition to low barriers to claims, the fact-finding and administrative 
procedures required of governments under partial regulatory takings regimes 
make these compensation systems costly. The government must incur the costs 
of transacting not only with the individuals bringing takings claims but also 
with the owners of adjacent or nearby property who might be affected.85  
Florida’s procedures for compensating landowners provide a vivid example 
of the layered administrative procedure that exists for processing landowners’ 
regulatory takings claims.86 After receiving a landowner claim, the government 
agency must then notify all parties who participated in the claim action and any 
owners of property bordering the claimant’s property that a claims process has 
commenced.87 The statute also requires the agency to make a written 
settlement offer within the 180-day period between an owner’s filing of a claim 
 
81.  See Mitchell Pellecchia, Bert J. Harris Act Still Looms over Alaska Parcel Concessions, Miami 
Beach, MIAMI SUN POST, July 1, 2004, available at http://www.miamisunpost.com/archives/ 
2004/07-01-04/ninethstoryfrontpage.htm. 
82.  Ronald L. Weaver & Nicole S. Sayfie, 1999 Update on the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights 
Protection, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 49, 49. The final status of these claims is unclear, but for 
earlier claims under the Act settled before litigation, Florida cities have allowed developers 
to skirt regulations. Id. at 52.  
83.  See id. at 52 (discussing how Fidelity Federal Savings Bank and the city of West Palm Beach 
reached a settlement permitting Fidelity to construct two fifteen-story buildings but not a 
proposed six-story parking structure, all of which a city referendum had previously denied).  
84.  See id. at 53 (describing how Kolar, an automobile service station, and the city of Sarasota 
discussed a cash settlement agreement after the company claimed to have suffered an 
$84,000 decrease in property values due to city enforcement of a zoning ordinance that 
disallowed Kolar’s nonconforming use). 
85.  See, e.g., MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 313 (Or. 2006) (discussing a 
plaintiff’s complaints of harms imposed by Measure 37 waivers granted for a neighbor’s 
land).  
86.  See, e.g., Stacey S. White, State Property Rights Laws: Recent Impacts and Future Implications, 
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., July 2000, at 1, 6 (discussing “significant administrative 
expenses” in Florida). 
87.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(b) (West 2004). 
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and a court action.88 During this period, if the property owner does not accept 
the settlement offer, the agency must “issue a written ripeness decision 
identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.”89 
Following a claimant’s rejection of the settlement offer and the ripeness 
decision, the claimant may file a compensation claim in the Florida circuit 
courts, and the statute provides detailed requirements for the courts’ review of 
these claims.90  
Oregon’s claims process also involves a multistep administrative response, 
requiring the state’s Department of Administrative Services to provide written 
notice to owners within the vicinity, to review the claim, and to forward it to all 
agencies that have enforced or enacted the challenged land use regulation.91 
The agencies involved must then produce a draft report with preliminary 
determinations on the merits, followed by a comment period and a final report 
by the Department and the agencies.92 Initial estimates of the costs of these 
administrative activities are high.93 
C. Why Now?  
Courts have applied regulatory takings analyses for years. So why has this 
movement recently grown stronger? This Note argues that the partial 
regulatory takings movement is gaining strength for three reasons: (1) a belief 
that the courts and the takings precedents have not sufficiently addressed 
government overreach and the inequitable burdens of regulation; (2) 
discontent with environmental and land use laws; and (3) the strength of 
national libertarian involvement and information campaigns that connect 
regulatory takings issues to eminent domain.  
 
88.  Id. § 70.001(4)(a), (c). 
89.  Id. § 70.001(5)(a). 
90.  See id. § 70.001(5)(b), (6)(a)-(b). 
91.  See ORCP 21 Motions To Dismiss at 4, Bergey v. Wash. County, No. C053203CV (Wash. 
County, Or., Cir. Ct. June 15, 2006), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/hot_topics/pdf/ 
measure37/bergey_orcp_rule_21_motions_to_dismiss.pdf (describing the claims process). 
92.  See id.  
93.  See Bill Bradbury & Randall Edwards, Estimated Cost to Taxpayers (n.d.), in Or. Sec’y of 
State, Measure 37: Argument in Opposition, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/ 
guide/meas/m37_opp.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (projecting $344 million in annual 
administrative expenses for the state and local governments).  
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1. Inequitable Burdens and a Weak Judicial Status Quo 
All of the 2006 regulatory takings initiatives voiced a common concern: 
that regulations unduly burden landowners without proper compensation.94 
For some, this discontent stems in part from a belief that judge-made 
regulatory takings doctrine fails to address these burdens adequately.95  
Justice Holmes’s admission in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that some 
regulations “go[] too far,”96 and thereby constitute takings of private property, 
suggested a spectrum of regulatory intrusiveness: some regulations have 
acceptable impacts on private owners, while others require compensation.97 
Subsequently, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court 
developed three factors for determining when regulatory impacts on private 
property owners merit compensation.98 Admitting that the Penn Central 
analysis was essentially “ad hoc,”99 however, the Court held in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council that a regulation’s destruction of all “economically 
 
94.  Proposition 207 sec. 2(A)(4) (Ariz. 2006), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/ 
2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf (“[T]he state and 
municipal governments of Arizona consistently encroach on the rights of private citizens to 
own and use their property . . . .”); Proposition 90 sec. 1(b) (Cal. 2006), available at 
http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf (“State and local governments have 
undermined private property rights through . . . the regulation of private property . . . .”); 
Proposition 2 pmbl. (Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/ 
06init08.htm (“State and municipal governments of Idaho consistently encroach on the 
property rights of its private citizens . . . especially as a result of the enactment and 
enforcement of land use laws that . . . [reduce] the fair market value of their property.”); 
Initiative Measure No. 933 § 1 (Wash. 2006), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/ 
elections/initiatives/text/i933.pdf (“[G]overnmental restrictions on the use of property have 
increased substantially, creating hardships for many, and destroying reasonable expectations 
of being able to make reasonable beneficial use of property.”). 
95.  See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 40, at 3 (“Across the nation, dozens of grassroots advocacy groups 
. . . . have arisen because officials have aggressively disregarded property rights and courts 
have done little to vindicate those rights.”); see also infra note 103 (highlighting the 
discontent with court takings decisions expressed in California Proposition 90). 
96.  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  
97.  But see Oswald, supra note 4, at 530-31 (arguing that the Supreme Court is wrong to 
characterize takings as actions that cross an “invisible line” on a “continuum” that runs from 
“physical confiscation of property,” i.e., traditional eminent domain, to “valid police power 
action”). 
98.  438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (specifying as the three factors the “economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant,” the regulation’s interference with the claimant’s investment-
backed expectations, and the “character of the governmental action”); see also Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (discussing these factors). 
99.  438 U.S. at 124. 
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productive or beneficial uses of land” would negate the need for a case-specific 
analysis, constitute a “total taking,” and require compensation.100 The Court in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. created another categorical 
exception to Penn Central’s balancing test when it held that the physical 
invasion of property constitutes a taking.101 And in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., the Court affirmed the existence of three categories of regulatory takings: 
government actions that fail to meet the Penn Central balancing test, that 
deprive private property of “all economically beneficial us[e],” or that 
physically invade or appropriate private property.102 
For advocates of partial regulatory takings regimes, however, this body of 
law fails to ensure that governments will compensate property owners for 
losses sustained from regulatory takings.103 Current doctrine establishes a 
higher minimum threshold of value diminution than do the proposed 
legislative definitions of takings, thus allowing government regulation to 
devalue a large portion (up to at least 75%) of a landowner’s property104 
without any accompanying compensation. Even under Lucas, a property owner 
will not receive compensation if the regulation proscribes a land use “not part 
of his title to begin with,”105 and a court must also inquire into the nature of the 
proposed uses before awarding compensation.106 Similarly, although the Court 
refined the “goes too far” standard by holding that a taking occurs when the 
government physically invades or occupies property,107 most regulations 
affecting real property do not include this kind of intrusion.108 And the Court’s 
broad statement that “a ‘taking’ may more readily be found” for “physical 
invasion” than for an adjustment of “benefits and burdens . . . to promote the 
 
100.  505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
101.  458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
102.  544 U.S. at 538-39 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019). 
103.  See, e.g., Proposition 90 sec. 1(c) (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/ 
pdf/prop90_text.pdf (“The courts have not required government to pay compensation to 
property owners when enacting statutes . . . , laws, rules or regulations not related to public 
health and safety that reduce the value of private property.”); Eagle, supra note 40, at 15-19. 
104.  See supra note 55. 
105.  505 U.S. at 1027. 
106.  A court should consider the harm to the public and neighboring lands caused by a 
landowner’s proposed property uses; the “social value” of these uses and whether they are 
appropriate for the property in question; and the availability of alternatives to the harmful 
uses. Id. at 1030-31. 
107.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
108.  See, e.g., id. at 426 (stating that government physical intrusions are “restriction[s] of an 
unusually serious character”). 
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common good”109 fails to reassure property owners that their property will 
escape this court-supported reshuffling of burdens. 
2. Growing Distaste for Environmental and Land Use Laws  
In addition to concerns about perceived judicial failures to resolve unfair 
burdens, advocates of partial regulatory takings regimes have frequently voiced 
opposition to laws controlling land uses, which often have environmental 
goals. Many of the advertisements for the 2006 initiatives criticized local laws 
that limited land development110 or prevented landowners from using or 
enjoying their property.111 This concern has also been expressed outside of 
advertising campaigns. Although residents with established roots in a 
community may worry about growth, they may also worry that new 
restrictions will not match their goals. Farmers and ranchers, for example, have 
expressed distaste for newcomers or “city folks” who modify their own 
property and then enact environmental reforms to prevent others from doing 
the same.112  
Some therefore argue that the critics of the growing bodies of land use 
regulation and environmental laws “laid the seeds for the current statutory 
takings movement.”113 If true, this connection may support William Fischel’s 
view that the demand for compensation increases as the marginal benefits of 
regulations decrease.114 In other words, the movement may arise in part from 
 
109.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
110.  See, e.g., Ad—Debbie Richards (Internet broadcast Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=K4dUdh_WOEQ (transcript on file with author) (featuring a landowner who 
argues that the government will take her house and give it to a developer and that 
Proposition 207 will force the government to pay property owners whose property has been 
damaged); YES on Prop 2 Commercial Idaho ThisHouseisMYHome.com (Internet broadcast 
Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpgTF_ou9tM (transcript on file with 
author) (“Proposition 2 says politicians can’t take your home and give it to developers. And 
if they reduce your property value they must compensate you for it.”). 
111.  YES I-933 (Washington Farm Bureau) (Internet broadcast Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RuL92EKnv4 (transcript on file with author) 
(portraying, for example, one landowner’s complaint that the government would not allow 
him to walk on several acres of his own land). 
112.  See, e.g., William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, 
at 34; Telephone Interview with Heather Hansen, Executive Dir., Wash. Friends of Farms & 
Forests, in Olympia, Wash. (Oct. 25, 2006) (discussing farmers’ frustration with city 
residents who impose their environmental goals on rural populations).  
113.  Jacobs & Ohm, supra note 18, at 180. 
114.  See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 88-89 
(1995). 
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property owners’ belief that zoning and land use controls yield decreasing 
marginal benefits. 
3. Connections to Eminent Domain  
In addition, proponents of partial regulatory takings regimes have argued 
that government abuse of eminent domain powers connects directly to 
regulatory abuse. In its 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a city’s use of eminent domain to condemn land for private use 
with the intent of benefiting the public.115 This decision sparked a nationwide 
reaction during the 2006 elections, as voters demanded assurance that the 
government would not take private property for private development 
purposes.116 Supporters of the partial regulatory initiatives consistently 
embedded the regulatory takings issue within arguments about eminent 
domain.117 Regardless of whether joining these two issues is appropriate,118 
 
115.  545 U.S. 469, 488-89 (2005). 
116.  Voters in many states approved constitutional amendments and initiatives that limited 
eminent domain powers. See, e.g., Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep’t of State, November 7, 2006 
General Elections, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/DetailRpt.Asp? 
ELECTIONDATE=11/7/2006&RACE=A08 (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (showing 69% voter 
approval of Florida’s eminent domain constitutional amendment); Fla. Dep’t of State, 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments To Be Voted on November 7, 2006, at 10, 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/pdf/2006_prop_consti_amend.pdf (last visited Apr. 
25, 2007) (allowing the government to transfer private property to a “natural person or 
private entity” only when 60% of each legislative house supports the transfer); Or. Sec’y of 
State, Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 2000-2006, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/ 
elections/elections22a.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (providing a count of yes and no votes 
for a measure limiting eminent domain); Or. Sec’y of State, Measure 39, 
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72006/guide/meas/m39_text.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2007); S.C. State Election Comm’n, 2006 Statewide Constitutional Amendments, 
http://www.scvotes.org/2006/08/14/2006_statewide_constitutional_amendments (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2007); S.C. State Election Comm’n, South Carolina Election Results, 
https://statereports.essvote.com/webresults/results?electionSelect=51&reportScope=ST&repor
tType=SUMMARY (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (providing a count of yes and no votes for 
Constitutional Amendment 5, which prohibited the use of eminent domain for economic 
benefit unless the condemnation was for public use); see also Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits 
on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at C6. 
117.  See supra note 110. 
118.  Opponents have argued that eminent domain served as a Trojan horse for the regulatory 
takings issue, while some proponents have expressed a belief that the two issues are 
inherently connected. Compare Brady, supra note 20 (describing initiative opponents’ views 
that initiative writers had dishonestly wedded the takings issue to the unrelated eminent 
domain issue), with Telephone Interview with Neil Derry, San Bernardino City 
Councilmember, Ward 4, in San Bernardino, Cal. (Nov. 3, 2006) (arguing that regulatory 
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these advertisements demonstrate the belief that government overreach 
requires immediate action through regulatory takings and eminent domain 
legislation.  
D. Government Responses to the Costs of Partial Regulatory Takings Regimes  
The regulatory takings movement already has changed government policy. 
The low procedural and substantive barriers to claims, and the high 
compensatory and administrative costs that result, are likely reasons for this 
change. This Section discusses four ways in which governments may respond 
to partial regulatory takings regimes, as well as the implications of those 
options. It concludes that governments will likely continue to react to partial 
regulatory takings claims in two primary ways: regulatory inaction and waiver 
of regulations for landowners who demand substantial compensation. Of 
course, the actual effects of the growing partial regulatory takings movement 
will vary based on how state and local governments respond. Most 
importantly, if governments under partial regulatory takings regimes cannot 
raise taxes and continue regulating at their accustomed level, the type and 
quantity of land use regulations may change substantially.  
1. Universal Payment 
Under a partial regulatory takings regime, governments can continue to 
regulate if they simply pay all legitimate compensation claims. But this scenario 
is unlikely. Partial regulatory takings regimes force state and local governments 
to become economic actors, although the extent to which they actually behave 
as wealth-maximizing “firms” is disputed.119 Regulation becomes a purchasing 
game, in which governments determine whether they should “purchase” (i.e., 
enact or enforce) a given regulation after investigating the “price” of enacting 
or enforcing it (i.e., the amount that they and their constituents would pay) 
and the opportunity costs of not doing so. Many scholars believe that forcing 
the government to internalize the cost of regulation is beneficial. 
Internalization can prevent “excessive government action”120 and can force 
 
takings are very similar to eminent domain, in that the government may regulate land to the 
point at which the owner no longer can use the land).  
119.  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354-57 (2000). 
120.  Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
1, 21 (1985). 
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governments to consider regulatory alternatives more carefully,121 thus 
encouraging them to follow “normal democratic processes” and to respond to 
taxpayer concerns.122  
Yet some authors have argued that governments differ from typical firms in 
key ways and thus will not respond to costs as firms do.123 These authors claim 
that governments seek the path of least political resistance and have a duty to 
regulate. If they must internalize costs by compensating property owners for 
takings, they may continue to regulate but pass on the costs to taxpayers 
generally rather than to concentrated interest groups.124 At least one local 
government under a partial regulatory takings regime has chosen to “regulate 
and pay” despite the high costs. The town of Eustis, Florida, passed costly 
historic preservation laws despite potential compensation requirements under 
Florida’s partial regulatory takings regime.125  
If governments pass on the costs of regulation to all taxpayers rather than 
to a burdened few, perhaps only those regulations most beneficial to the public 
(i.e., those with benefits that outweigh their costs) will be successful. I argue, 
however, that other factors are likely to persuade governments under partial 
regulatory takings regimes to reject payment as a way to resolve takings claims. 
As discussed in the following two Subsections, the types of partial regulatory 
takings regimes proposed in 2006 could create administrative costs and tasks 
so burdensome that they would overwhelm governments, causing them to 
avoid certain land use regulations altogether or to waive them whenever a 
landowner made a claim, as has typically occurred in Oregon.126 As the 
Supreme Court has stated, treating land use regulations “all as per se takings 
would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could 
afford.”127 Even if governments can deflect the costs of compensation by 
 
121.  See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 54-56 (1977).  
122.  Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
123.  See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 119, at 354-57. 
124.  See id. at 375-76; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 145-46 (2005) (summarizing various views on government internalization 
of costs). 
125.  See Tyler E. Chapman, Note, To Save and Save Not: The Historic Preservation Implications of 
the Property Rights Movement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 111, 141-42, 149 (1997); Rick Reed, Eustis 
Marches Ahead with Historic Districts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 1995, at 1.  
126.  See Abel, supra note 80 (noting that Oregon’s government had waived each uncontested 
claim as of March 2006). 
127.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002). 
    
searching for balance 
1541 
 
passing them on to the taxpayer base, raising taxes is politically unpopular.128 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the administrative costs of processing and 
analyzing each compensation claim may be prohibitive for governments and 
may thus encourage regulatory inaction. 
2. Inaction 
Local and state governments can avoid the costs of compensation merely by 
not taking new regulatory action or not enforcing existing regulations. 
Ignoring the noneconomic costs, this is the cheapest and easiest route; it 
requires no processing of landowner claims and no payment. Yet government 
inaction also has its costs, including loss of municipal control over detrimental 
land uses.129 Following passage of Florida’s partial regulatory takings regime, 
for example, Palm Beach abandoned efforts at development control in an 
agricultural reserve area, West Palm Beach did not enact a height limit 
ordinance on buildings, and Fort Lauderdale ended plans to revise its zoning 
code.130 One author has suggested that partial regulatory takings laws decrease 
regulatory action in Florida (as they did in Arizona under that state’s previous 
private property protection legislation) when “development pressures are 
strong” and administrative agencies have the power to pass regulations that 
may substantially diminish property values.131 Other analyses, however, imply 
that rather than forcing government inaction, partial regulatory takings 
regimes inspire more cooperation between government agencies and 
constituents when agencies regulate.132 
 
128.  Justice Scalia might support such a result, given that he has argued that the Takings Clause 
“require[s] [subsidies] to be applied, in general, through the process of taxing and 
spending, where both economic effects and competing priorities are more evident.” Pennell 
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
129.  The extent to which a lack of regulation actually affects land use planning depends on the 
existence of feasible alternative planning mechanisms, as discussed in further detail infra 
Section II.A. 
130.  See Kristen M. Fletcher et al., Property Rights and Takings Legislation in the Gulf States: 
Just the Beginning or Is the Revolution Over?, http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/MS-
AL/takings.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). 
131.  Jacobs, supra note 18, at 3-4. 
132.  See White, supra note 86, at 7-8. 
    




A middle ground between inaction and universal compensation is selective 
waiver, whereby the government chooses to enforce a regulation for some 
landowners and to waive it for others. While some proposals, such as 
California’s Proposition 90 and Idaho’s Proposition 2, did not permit waiver or 
failed to mention the waiver option,133 the two most recently enacted partial 
regulatory takings regimes explicitly permit waiver. Oregon allows 
governments, “in lieu of payment of just compensation,” to “modify, remove, 
or not to apply the land use regulations to allow the owner to use the property” 
as was permitted before the regulation.134 Arizona’s Proposition 207 has a 
similar provision.135 
In Oregon, waiver is not only allowed but is, for all practical purposes, 
required. The director of Oregon’s Department of Land Conservation must 
waive the imposition of a regulation for each landowner who has made a 
compensation claim unless the legislature has enacted legislation that provides 
funds for the claim.136 Thus, the potential compensation costs are extremely 
high (approximately $15 billion137), but actual payment has not occurred. 
Although the costs of a given individual claim for compensation may be low, 
the government, which does not have prior authorization from the legislature 
for any of the claims,138 has no option but to waive. The simple assertion by a 
claimant that a regulation has, “on the balance of probabilities,” caused her 
 
133.  Proposition 90 (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_ 
text.pdf (mentioning waivers only in the jury waiver context); Proposition 2 (Idaho 2006), 
available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/06init08.htm (failing to mention 
waivers). 
134.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(8) (2005). Waivers have been the most contentious legal issue 
relating to Measure 37. See Abel, supra note 80. 
135.  Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(E)-(F) (Ariz. 2006) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
1134(E)-(F)), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/ 
PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf (implying the waiver option by stating that “[i]f a land 
use law continues to apply to private real property more than ninety days” after the written 
compensation demand, “the owner has a cause of action for just compensation,” and adding 
that any waiver “runs with the land”). Local governments’ ability to waive regulations in 
Arizona of course will vary depending on courts’ future decisions regarding the scope of the 
waiver provision. 
136.  OR. ADMIN. R. 660-002-0010(8)(c) (2007), available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/ 
rules/OARS_600/OAR_660/660_002.html; see also Sullivan, supra note 75, at 143 
(discussing the regulation’s requirements). 
137.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
138.  See Sullivan, supra note 75, at 143 (observing that, under the regulation requiring prior 
legislative authorization of funds, the government has “no ability to pay”). 
    
searching for balance 
1543 
 
property value to diminish therefore forces the government to waive the 
regulation for that owner.139 With a waiver option, governments can continue 
enacting regulations knowing that they can choose not to apply them to 
property owners who make compensation claims for loss.  
The core problem with waivers is that they can undermine public interests 
that regulations are intended to protect. For example, if a local government 
implements an open space ordinance to create an area for wildlife habitat and 
human recreation but waives the application of the ordinance for even a small 
percentage of landowner claimants, then a checkerboard could result, 
rendering the regulation essentially ineffective. To address this problem, some 
states have imposed conditions on waivers. Florida, for example, allows a 
governmental entity to settle with a private claimant by issuing a 
“modification, variance, or special exception to the application of a rule . . . as it 
would otherwise apply to the subject real property,” but it requires that “the 
relief granted shall protect the public interest served by the regulations at 
issue.”140 Notably, Florida also provides an alternative to waivers, permitting 
the government to settle for “[l]and swaps or exchanges.”141 This option could 
solve the checkerboard problems in the open space hypothetical, as the 
government could provide the objecting landowner with development rights in 
an area outside of the proposed open space boundaries. 
4. Exemptions 
Finally, state and local governments can attempt to redraft their regulations 
in order to fit specified exemptions from the partial regulatory takings laws. All 
existing and proposed partial regulatory takings measures contain some 
exemptions, typically for nuisance and obscenity laws. Arizona and Oregon 
have exempted from the compensation requirement laws applying to public 
health and safety;142 compliance with federal law;143 pornography, nude 
 
139.  Id. (discussing a claimant’s ability to obtain a waiver simply by alleging “some reduction in 
the fair market value of the subject property”). 
140.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(d)(1) (West 2004). 
141.  Id. § 70.001(4)(c)(4). 
142.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(B) (2005); Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(1) (Ariz. 2006) 
(to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134(B)(1)), available at http://www.azsos.gov/ 
election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006).pdf (exempting 
public safety laws, including those relating to “fire and building codes, health and 
sanitation, transportation or traffic control, solid or hazardous waste, and pollution 
control”). 
143.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(C); Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(3). 
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dancing, and obscenity;144 sex offender housing, illegal drug sales, and liquor 
control;145 and historic common law public nuisances.146 The initiative drafters 
in Idaho proposed similar exemptions for regulations concerning nuisance, 
public safety, and compliance with federal laws.147 The remaining initiatives 
would have exempted public safety laws148 as well as some laws limiting 
“nuisance” activities associated with obscenity or environmental harms.149 
Most attempted to limit the exemptions by requiring the public entity enacting 
or enforcing a regulation to prove that the exemption applied to the proposed 
law150 or by requiring the exemptions to be narrowly construed.151 The extent 
to which governments will claim these exemptions is unclear, but in Oregon it 
appears that state and county governments only rarely have claimed the public 
health and safety exemption.152  
The nuisance exemption creates the most uncertainty for agencies 
attempting to determine whether a regulation will require compensation under 
a regulatory takings statute. Agencies issuing regulations will not typically 
know, prior to a court ruling on the issue, whether proposed regulations will 
qualify as limitations on nuisance.153 Some of the proposed initiative language 
narrows “nuisance” to specific activities, such as the “abatement of specific 
conditions on specific parcels.”154 The key limitation, whether defined by the 
courts or by partial regulatory takings initiatives, is that a nuisance, viewed ex 
ante, rarely includes government regulation of broad activities, such as 
industry, that only have the potential to cause harm. Many zoning regulations 
that govern the type and scale of land uses in a neighborhood are not nuisance 
regulations but rather exercises of the police power to protect the general 
 
144.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(D) (addressing only pornography and nude dancing); Ariz. 
Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(4) (covering all three categories). 
145.  Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(4). 
146.  OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(A); Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(B)(2).  
147.  Proposition 2 § 4(6)(a)-(d) (Idaho 2006), available at http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/ 
inits/06init08.htm. 
148.  See Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(b)(8) (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.voterguide. 
ss.ca.gov/pdf/prop90_text.pdf; Initiative Measure No. 933 § 2(2)(c)(i)-(ii) (Wash. 2006), 
available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/ text/i933.pdf. 
149.  Cal. Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(e). 
150.  See Ariz. Proposition 207 sec. 3, § 12-1134(C); Idaho Proposition 2 § 4(8). 
151.  See Wash. Initiative Measure No. 933 § 2(2)(c). 
152.  See Sullivan, supra note 75, at 155.  
153.  See, e.g., id. at 157 (discussing how agencies attempting to use the nuisance exemption must 
“guess” the outcome of “difficult case law in an equitable setting”).  
154.  Cal. Proposition 90 sec. 3, § 19(e); see also Wash. Initiative Measure No. 933 § 2(2)(c)(i)-(ii). 
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welfare.155 Thus, governments will likely be unable to invoke the nuisance 
exemption for many zoning regulations and, because of the high costs of these 
regulations under a partial regulatory takings regime, will be less likely to enact 
or enforce them. 
ii. community impacts:  inequity and limited participation 
By forcing state and local governments to consider how public regulations 
affect property owners, and by making them pay for regulations that decrease 
private property values, the partial regulatory takings initiatives spare some 
individuals from burdens more appropriately borne by the general public. 
However, by increasing the costs of land use planning, the regimes also limit 
governments’ ability to implement necessary land use planning regulations. 
This Part argues that constraining the ability of governments to achieve land 
use planning through regulation has two major negative effects. First, it limits 
the capacity of communities to influence the character of their neighborhoods. 
Second, it increases existing inequities among neighborhoods trying to limit 
the presence of undesired land uses. These effects are particularly important 
given low-income communities’ lack of sufficient alternatives to zoning 
regulations.  
A. Zoning and Neighborhood Character  
As discussed above, governments faced with a partial regulatory takings 
regime are likely to waive specific applications of their land use laws or to enact 
and enforce fewer zoning laws in the first place. This reluctance to regulate 
would extend both to “preventive” zoning intended to limit undesirable land 
uses and to “positive” or “proactive” zoning laws that require basic levels of 
infrastructure, impose aesthetic standards, or support housing for low-income 
residents. This Section argues that zoning provides an important means for 
residents to influence the character of their neighborhoods and that limited 
zoning therefore negatively impacts neighborhoods. 
Viewed in its most ideal sense, zoning provides a deliberative process 
through which people can express their preferences about the growth and 
 
155.  See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926) (differentiating 
between, but upholding, zoning laws “excluding from residential sections offensive trades, 
industries and structures likely to create nuisances”—i.e., laws that specifically targeted 
nuisance—and those requiring the exclusion “in general terms of all industrial 
establishments”). 
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character of their community.156 The prevalence of zoning laws157 suggests that 
residents may indeed have nonfinancial interests in the planning and 
coordination of their communities. And participation in governing one’s own 
community is not a recent phenomenon; its value has been recognized for 
centuries.158 Zoning regulations can be seen to preserve “collective values” and 
to protect “a neighborhood from encroachments by land uses inconsistent with 
its character.”159 Courts also have given credence to the view of land use 
planning as a deliberative tool160 to preserve overall neighborhood character 
(not just individual properties). For example, they have upheld procedural 
measures that give all community members “a voice in decisions that will affect 
the future development of their own community”161 as well as government 
actions that “preserve the . . . nature of a community and . . . maintain its 
aesthetic and functional characteristics through zoning requirements.”162  
Admittedly, one should not be too idealistic about community 
participation. There is error in “indifference to the empirical realities of 
municipal governments”163 and in assuming that residents within a community 
view themselves as interdependent rather than self-interested.164 But people 
 
156.  See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971) (stating that a procedure requiring 
referendum approval of public housing projects “ensures that all the people of a community 
will have a voice in a decision”); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land 
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 890-91 (1983) (fitting piecemeal 
land use zoning decisions within a “mediation” model, under which communities through 
the local government request accommodations from developers to reach desired goals, such 
as the preservation of park space or a “familiar community landmark”); Eric H. Steele, 
Participation and Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (1986). 
157.  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
45, 46 & n.6 (1994) (discussing the universality of zoning laws). 
158.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 156, at 883-84 (describing participation as a “particularly venerable 
legitimator of local government,” and recalling that “the Antifederalists . . . advocated a 
government of local participation and citizen control”). 
159.  Karkkainen, supra note 157, at 68. 
160.  See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
340-41 (2002) (discussing the importance of “protecting the decisional process” for a 
regional plan, and finding that a rule penalizing long deliberations would “disadvantage 
those landowners and interest groups who are not as organized or familiar with the 
planning process”). 
161.  Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 143. 
162.  Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 821 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995). 
163.  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City 
Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2019 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: 
BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)).  
164.  See id. at 2020.  
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generally do care about participation to the extent that it affects where they 
live. Residents of all income groups become attached not only to their personal 
home or living space165 but also to the traits of their surrounding 
neighborhood. Even if not interdependent in spirit, residents—whether 
homeowners or renters—“selfishly” care, for example, about the appearance of 
their street or the neighborhood park where their children play in the summer. 
Farmers want to ensure that enough agricultural land exists to support supply 
and business networks in their region.166 Public zoning proceedings allow 
residents to express their desires for the preservation of the characteristics that 
they most strongly value and to develop a degree of consensus around core 
community issues.167 
Preventive land use regulation or its functional equivalent is important in 
determining the compatibility of land uses within a neighborhood—a 
significant component of community character. At the parcel-by-parcel level, 
studies have found zoning laws to be positively correlated with property values 
because they prevent the diminution in value from mixed and incompatible 
land uses.168 Consider the following stylized hypothetical. A new zoning 
ordinance is enacted that limits an area to single-family residential and 
agricultural uses. Neighbor A claims that she had planned to subdivide her 
land to build a condominium complex and that her property value has now 
 
165.  See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 362 (1986) 
(discussing residents’ interest in remaining in an “established” home). 
166.  E.g., Telephone Interview with Bob Hart, Vice President, Bd. of Skagitonians To Preserve 
Farmland, in Mount Vernon, Wash. (Oct. 25, 2006) (discussing how, in his rural 
Washington county, without zoning, the key players in the agricultural system would leave 
and take the necessary support network with them). But see FISCHEL, supra note 114, at 282 
(arguing that residents in rural areas “dislike zoning” because they want to preserve future 
land development opportunities). 
167.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 156, at 887-90 (discussing mediation and consensus surrounding 
competing community values in local land use decision-making); Ariel Graff, Comment, 
Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is 
RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485, 519 
(2005) (arguing that developing a comprehensive zoning plan “forces residents to mediate 
between conflicting values and arrive at a consensus that accurately captures local 
sentiments”). 
168.  See, e.g., Stephen Malpezzi et al., New Place-to-Place Housing Price Indexes for U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas, and Their Determinants, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 235, 263 (1996) (finding that 
regulations drove up “quality adjusted” rents and housing prices); Janet Furman Speyrer, 
The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on Market Values of Single-Family Homes in Houston, 2 J. 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 117, 125 (1989) (finding that, controlling for relevant factors, 
housing prices are higher in Houston neighborhoods with restrictions similar to zoning laws).  
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decreased by $1 million.169 The local government chooses to waive the 
ordinance for Neighbor A. Now suppose that Neighbor B owns a small nursery 
at which customers enjoy fresh produce, clean air, and a pleasant view. 
Neighbor B has no claim to compensation when Neighbor A develops her land, 
blocks the pleasant view, and casts shade upon Neighbor B’s crops. Neighbor 
B’s most feasible option is to bring a costly nuisance suit that is unlikely to 
succeed.170 In other words, if property values are highly interdependent, when 
a partial regulatory takings regime provides full restoration for loss, the burden 
might shift to neighbors who will then suffer from governmental inaction—or, 
if the government pays rather than waives, who will face a higher tax bill. One 
landowner’s gain will be another’s loss.171  
Preventive zoning is necessary not only to avoid negative neighbor-to-
neighbor impacts but also to prevent disproportionate levels of unwanted uses 
in certain communities. Under regulatory takings regimes, landowners make 
compensation claims for disparate uses prevented by zoning regulations, not 
just for moderate neighborly annoyances;172 these regimes could therefore 
reduce the benefits that preventive zoning typically offers in its moderation of 
highly disparate land uses. Substantially disparate uses are likely to affect land 
values throughout a neighborhood, even if moderately mixed uses are not. 
Studies have shown that property values can be strongly interdependent when 
nonresidential uses, such as industry, exist near residential areas.173 Preventive 
 
169.  For examples of claims similar to this hypothetical, see Sheila A. Martin & Katie Shriver, 
Documenting the Impact of Measure 37: Selected Case Studies (Jan. 2006), 
http://www.pdx.edu/media/i/m/ims_M37brainerdreport.pdf.  
170.  See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 461-64 (1988) (discussing the difficulty of applying nuisance 
laws to various environmental disputes, such as when structures cast shadows on 
neighboring land). 
171.  This argument, of course, assumes that the initial regulation was in fact efficient (i.e., that it 
did not substantially diminish property values). If the government frequently regulates in 
ways that are negative-sum in order to placate powerful rent-seekers—as takings advocates 
claim—then requiring compensation would appropriately discourage such negative-sum 
regulation. 
172.  See, e.g., Measure 37 Database Search, http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IMS/currentprojects/m37/ 
index.php (set “Development Requested” to “Industrial,” set “Values Returned” to 50, and 
check “Display individual claims”) (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). As of April 25, 2007, property 
owners had submitted sixty-seven claims for requested “Residential Commercial 
Industrial,” “Residential Industrial,” “Industrial,” and “Commercial Industrial” 
developments; the claims involved approximately 12,496 acres and $674 million in 
compensation requested. Id. 
173.  See David M. Grether & Peter Mieszkowski, The Effects of Nonresidential Land Uses on the 
Prices of Adjacent Housing: Some Estimates of Proximity Effects, 8 J. URB. ECON. 1, 15 (1980) 
(“[A]s one might expect, heavy industrial activity or public housing projects can have 
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zoning or a similar alternative, therefore, is necessary to control industrial-
residential combinations, protecting nearby property values or reducing the 
likelihood of externalities from incompatible uses. 
When uses are not highly incompatible, proponents of partial regulatory 
takings may argue that zoning laws are unnecessary and costly. Mildly 
incompatible174 land use such as multifamily homes abutting single-family 
homes, for example, may not lower neighboring property values,175 and zoning 
therefore may be unnecessary to regulate these uses. This Note argues, 
however, that even if slightly incompatible land uses do not reduce property 
values, property owners will be frustrated by their inability to influence 
(through zoning) proposed uses on neighboring lands that, although only a 
mild annoyance, may substantially affect their enjoyment of their own land.  
In Oregon, the partial regulatory takings regime has affected residents’ 
ability to participate in government planning decisions for neighboring 
properties. Before Measure 37, changes to neighboring properties typically 
required public participation or proof that a land use change met a minimum 
standard, such as public welfare or unusual hardship.176 Under Oregon’s 
partial regulatory takings regime, however, governments can now waive 
regulations without any public input—a process that Keith Aoki and others 
have described as the “private veto power”177 of the government. Neighbors 
have no legally defined opportunity to voice their concerns about the effect of 
zoning waivers “on neighboring properties or the surrounding community.”178 
Florida has avoided this participatory void to some extent by requiring official 
notice to all neighboring landowners whenever one landowner submits a 
 
adverse effects upon the prices of nearby residential property.”); see also John P. Crecine et 
al., Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for Municipal 
Zoning, 10 J.L. & ECON. 79, 94 (1967) (illustrating the interdependence of property values 
associated with significantly incompatible uses with the example of a glue factory at Park 
Avenue and 50th Street in New York City). 
174.  Note that some authors have disputed the categorization of “incompatible.” See, e.g., JANE 
JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 14, 153 (1961) (arguing that cities 
require “a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant 
mutual support,” including industry, and suggesting that mixed uses provide welcome 
diversity, not incompatibility). 
175.  See, e.g., Crecine et al., supra note 173, at 93-96 (concluding that land values in Pittsburgh 
are highly independent); Frederick H. Rueter, Externalities in Urban Property Markets: An 
Empirical Test of the Zoning Ordinance of Pittsburgh, 16 J.L. & ECON. 313, 330 (1973) (reaching 
a similar conclusion). 
176.  See Aoki et al., supra note 42, at 296.  
177.  Id.  
178.  Id.  
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claim179 but has failed to provide participatory options for these landowners. 
Regulations of Oregon’s Department of Administrative Services require similar 
notice to neighbors180 but also suffer from a dearth of participatory measures. 
Another option to improve residential input when governments waive 
regulations would be to provide mediation for landowners through a local 
ombudsman’s office. But partial regulatory takings regimes, with the exception 
of Florida’s and Oregon’s limited neighbor notice requirements and Arizona’s 
advocate for property rights181 (who has limited powers182) do not provide 
landowners with such options.  
Finally, zoning regulations not only can improve property values or the 
character of a community through preventive measures but also can create 
positive measures in the form of aesthetic benefits or “amenity effects”183 
through, for example, historic landmark preservation laws and environmental 
standards.184 Additionally, they can provide basic infrastructural services and 
ensure the provision of equitable housing for low- and middle-income groups 
through inclusionary zoning.185 These benefits could be lost under the 
restrictions of a partial regulatory takings regime. 
B. Zoning and Low-Income Communities  
In the absence of alternative mechanisms, partial regulatory takings 
regimes will make it difficult for communities to realize the benefits of zoning. 
It can be challenging to implement proactive zoning-type requirements 
without government control, particularly because of collective action problems. 
 
179.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(b) (West 2004). 
180.  See ORCP 21 Motions To Dismiss, supra note 91, at 4 (describing the requirement that the 
Department notify landowners within the vicinity of a claimant’s property after a claim has 
been submitted). 
181.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1312 (2004).  
182.  Id. § 41-1313(A)(2)-(3), (B)(2) (allowing the advocate to appear on behalf of property 
owners in “judicial, legislative, or administrative” tribunals, to “[a]dvise property owners” 
on takings issues, and to “[r]eceive complaints and inquiries from private property owners” 
regarding takings). 
183.  Jaeger, supra note 75, at 112-13. 
184.  See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
308-10, 342 (2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1978). 
185.  See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(discussing mandatory set-asides of affordable housing); Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, 
Zoning for All: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques To Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY 
L.J. 359, 377-79 (1995) (discussing density bonuses, which encourage the provision of low-
income housing). 
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Moreover, alternatives to preventive zoning are often inadequate for low-
income neighborhoods because such neighborhoods are at a financial 
disadvantage when they rely on private action.186 As a result, constraints on 
zoning are particularly worrisome for low-income communities. 
Although the evidence of the importance of preventive zoning for 
neighbor-to-neighbor impacts is mixed, at a minimum, preventive zoning for 
unwanted neighboring developments allows neighbors of all incomes to 
prevent unsightly or disturbing uses near their properties. The need for 
preventive zoning to address more severely incompatible uses seems especially 
clear because it allows communities to monitor and influence187 the 
development of locally undesirable land uses (“LULUs”) within their 
boundaries.188  
Some types of preventive zoning can be detrimental to low-income and 
minority residents,189 but I argue that preventive zoning measures to control 
the most noxious of neighboring uses are essential for these groups. 
Overwhelming evidence shows that low-income and minority communities 
currently shoulder a disproportionate burden of LULUs, such as waste disposal 
sites. This trend has been discussed extensively in the environmental justice 
literature.190 Developers may encourage (and governments may allow) the 
 
186.  See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective 
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 779 (1993) 
(“[A]ppropriate zoning protection [in low-income communities] is a critically important 
government service in determining the quality of a community’s residential environment.”). 
187.  See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land 
Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 109-10 (1998) (“[G]rassroots environmental justice 
activists might seek zoning map amendments to change more intensive use designations in 
their neighborhoods to less intensive use designations, a technique known as 
‘downzoning.’”); Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do with It? Environmental Justice and the 
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1068-71 (1993) (discussing 
the pros and cons of dispersion ordinances, which limit “‘excessive’ concentrations” of 
LULUs within a neighborhood or create minimum distance requirements between LULUs 
as a way to decrease their impact). 
188.  See, e.g., Dubin, supra note 186, at 779 (“[A]ppropriate zoning protection is a critically 
important government service in determining the quality of a community’s residential 
environment.”). 
189.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 264 (discussing the exclusion of “minority racial or ethnic 
groups” from purchasing land “in suburban communities that have strict minimum acreage 
requirements”); Dubin, supra note 186, at 741-43 (noting that discriminatory zoning can 
separate minority communities from other populations and then deprive them of basic 
zoning protections). 
190.  See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATIONS WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF 
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3-4 (1983), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/ 
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siting of LULUs in low-income and minority neighborhoods, and low-income 
and minority residents may also move to areas with LULUs for economic 
reasons.191 When residents have moved to the nuisance, they still need a voice 
in future decisions regarding the regulation of existing LULUs and the siting of 
new ones.192 Agencies and private developers consider the level of potential 
local opposition when siting LULUs,193 and sitings unsurprisingly tend to 
occur in areas with low political resistance.194 Partial regulatory takings regimes 
may limit the meager regulations available to fight against LULUs, thus further 
tying residents’ hands. This can perpetuate the cycle of inequitable burdens. 
Communities have several options through the zoning process to challenge 
unwanted uses, such as the siting of a landfill or industrial facility near a 
residential area. Interested parties can lobby a planning commission or town 
board not to approve the site plan, rezone the property to industrial use, or 
grant a special exception to a developer.195 However, under a partial regulatory 
takings regime (particularly a retroactive one), these measures may be too 
costly for the government to follow. And in a community that is quickly 
growing and has few existing zoning regulations, a prospective partial 
regulatory takings regime may discourage a government from enacting 
regulations that limit unwanted uses to strictly delineated areas. 
 
121648.pdf (noting that in three of the four hazardous waste landfill sites investigated, 
African-Americans made up more than 50% of the surrounding census areas, and, in all four 
of the communities surrounding the sites, the black population had a lower mean income 
than all other races combined); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority 
Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384-86 
(1994) (summarizing the relevant literature and discussing the “proven correlation” 
between LULUs and both race and class); Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura J. Fitton, Toxic 
Wastes and Race Revisited 2 (1994), http://www.cfpa.org/publications/pdf/toxicwastes.pdf. 
Whether siting decisions cause this extra burden on low-income and minority communities 
is less clear.  
191.  See, e.g., Been, supra note 190, at 1397; Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: 
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 808 (1993).  
192.  Cf. Lazarus, supra note 191, at 818-19 (discussing lower environmental quality in minority 
areas resulting from “less generous cleanup remedies, lower fines, slower cleanups, or more 
frequent [and unenforced] violations of pollution control laws”). 
193.  See id. at 816 (discussing how the EPA’s “capacity assurance requirements” lead state 
agencies and private companies to consider “the potential for effective, local political 
opposition”). 
194.  See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 3 
(2d ed. 1994); Been, supra note 187, at 1002. 
195.  See Arnold, supra note 187, at 110 (“[A] low-income minority neighborhood might contain 
several parcels zoned for heavy industrial use in close proximity to residences, schools, 
churches, health care facilities, and the like. Residents might seek to rezone some or all of 
these parcels for less intensive, yet economically viable, commercial uses.”). 
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Alternative venues for participation in this type of preventive action against 
unwanted uses are more costly for low-income communities, and the 
constraints on zoning likely to result from partial regulatory takings regimes 
will disproportionately harm these communities. Wealthy communities are 
likely to fare better than poorer communities in developing alternative options 
to land use regulation.196 To oppose a company attempting to build a factory 
nearby, residents can organize, advertise in newspapers, put up lawn signs, and 
carry out a full campaign. If they are unable to prevent the development, they 
can bring nuisance suits or move away. But low-income communities do not 
have the same financial resources to use these nongovernmental methods. 
Although they have succeeded in opposing LULUs through grassroots 
campaigns and political action,197 they are nevertheless at a participatory 
disadvantage because of the high costs of organizing.198 
In the realm of community planning for preventive measures, states have 
already recognized the particular need for consensus when contentious uses are 
proposed. New York has “Fair Share Criteria,” for example, which attempt to 
distribute city facilities fairly, to make allocation proposals based on “sound 
planning, zoning, . . . and systematic planning process[es],” to “foster 
consensus building,” and to “monitor[] neighborhood impacts of facilities 
once they are built.”199 Yet current government processes and alternative 
resources to fight proposed undesirable uses are all inadequate. A study in New 
York, for example, found that the complications of applying for zoning changes 
make it difficult for small neighborhood organizations to participate effectively 
in the system and that most applicants are “real estate developers and/or 
governmental entities.”200 Limited participatory opportunities in existing 
regulatory processes may be most acute for residents without vested landowner 
interests—such as tenants—who tend to be transient and who face 
organizational obstacles.201 
Just as communities (particularly wealthy ones) can potentially implement 
alternatives to preventive zoning that allow them to address unwanted uses, 
private communities can develop their own “proactive” zoning requirements 
 
196.  See, e.g., Brion, supra note 170, at 439-40. 
197.  See Been, supra note 187, at 1003-04. 
198.  See id. at 1002 (“[L]ocal protest can be costly, time-consuming, and politically damaging.”).  
199.  Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369 (1993) (discussing the purpose of the Fair Share 
Criteria). 
200.  Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the Connection?, 30 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 583 (2002). 
201.  See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory 
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 987-88 (1991). 
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through private covenants or other nongovernmental means.202 But such 
“private zoning” measures are typically difficult to implement. While a 
community is likely to rally against a proposed undesirable use in its town 
(through a measure similar to preventive zoning), private parties will show less 
support for potentially costly infrastructure or other amenity-based measures 
(similar to proactive zoning).203 Public choice theory suggests that the same 
problems of inaction could result even with governmental intervention,204 but 
this Note argues that local governments can, at times, overcome public choice 
problems arising from uneven interest group representation and act for the 
“general good” of the community.205 Private measures are unlikely to address 
the positive zoning needs of low-income residents because of collective action 
problems. The benefits of inclusionary zoning, for example, can be strong for 
minority and low-income residents. Limited zoning could therefore affect these 
neighborhoods most acutely, as many lack adequate infrastructure and 
services206 as well as affordable housing.207 
Whether through proactive zoning, preventive zoning, or zoning 
alternatives, communities need a means by which to plan the development and 
growth occurring in their neighborhoods. Yet existing structural, financial, and 
land use inequities exacerbate the difficulties of implementing community 
planning measures when partial regulatory takings regimes limit the available 
government solutions. 
 
202.  See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as 
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 713 (1973) (discussing covenants that cover 
“affirmative and negative obligations” and their potential to promote efficiency). 
203.  See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 6, at 155-56. 
204.  Public choice theory suggests that only small and powerful groups that will experience large 
benefits from a law will throw their resources into lobbying for that law. See RANDALL 
BARTLETT, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER 155 (1973). 
205.  See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., Seventy-Five Years 
Later: This Is Not Your Father’s Zoning Ordinance, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 659 (2001) 
(describing two studies of zoning in rural Wisconsin in which the government’s main 
concern was public health and safety and in which “special interest politics” had little 
influence). 
206.  For discussion of the inadequate infrastructure in low-income neighborhoods, see, for 
example, BULLARD, supra note 194, at 5; and John J. Betancur & Douglas C. Gills, Community 
Development in Chicago: From Harold Washington to Richard M. Daley, 594 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 102 (2004), which observes how improvements within the central 
business district of Chicago are “taking place at the expense and to the neglect of low-
income neighborhoods.” 
207.  Also note that zoning can increase property values and thereby harm low-income residents. 
Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981) 
(arguing that inclusionary zoning may be detrimental to low-income groups). 
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iii. a more equitable solution: regulatory balances 
Regulatory change is necessary in states both with and without partial 
regulatory takings regimes. In states without partial regulatory takings 
regimes, zoning, which is currently the most prevalent land use planning 
mechanism,208 reduces the negative externalities of unwanted neighboring 
uses and allows participation-based planning for growth and community 
character. However, zoning also has its costs in the form of uneven burdens 
for some property owners. Those hardest hit may be landowners such as 
farmers, who rely directly on the use of their land but face conservation 
measures or similar regulations that severely limit its use. Without some type 
of remedy for this loss, such as compensation for setting aside land or 
implementing conservation measures, their income-earning potential is 
substantially curtailed. In states with partial regulatory takings regimes, 
however, different problems arise. Limiting or freezing zoning measures by 
increasing their cost (without providing alternatives to community planning) 
is not a just solution because of the burdens it creates for many groups, 
particularly those in lower income brackets.  
To address the problems of insufficient participation in community 
planning and the resulting inequities, as well as substantial yet 
uncompensated regulatory burdens, this Note proposes a “regulatory 
balances” regime. The purpose would be to give multiple community groups 
a voice, including landowners concerned with regulatory burdens on their 
property and tenants or homeowners who may desire more regulation. States 
operating under the status quo should improve and supplement existing 
planning structures. States operating under partial regulatory takings 
regimes should implement effective governmental and nongovernmental 
mechanisms as alternatives both to costly regulations and to costly 
compensation claims. 
This “regulatory balances” approach differs from the balancing test often 
used by courts in regulatory takings cases that asks whether “individual 
losses are ‘outweighed by’ social gains.”209 Instead, the proposal here focuses 
on the process values of land use planning and on alternative substantive 
solutions. Building off existing alternatives to partial regulatory takings, I 
 
208.  See ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, MANAGING COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES, TECHNIQUES, AND 
IMPACTS 13 (1993) (discussing the prevalence of zoning); Ellickson, supra note 202, at 692 
(noting that more than 97% of cities with populations of more than 5000 people use 
zoning). 
209.  Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1193 (1967). 
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suggest three specific measures that could be implemented to create this 
system of regulatory balances. First, we should support the development of 
neighborhood input groups. Second, we should create local offices similar to 
existing ombudsmen’s offices to provide information and arbitration-type 
services and to monitor the effectiveness of the regulatory balances system as 
a whole. Third, to address the inequities of the current regulatory system as 
well as those caused by partial regulatory takings regimes, I propose a fund, 
maintained through voluntary and mandatory contributions, for 
conservation and other neighborhood improvement measures. 
A. Proposed Solutions in the Current Literature  
Scholars recently have proposed a range of community planning 
processes. Some have argued that existing zoning mechanisms, although not 
the only tool for planning, allow sufficient community determination of 
neighborhood character.210 As I argued in Part II, while zoning currently 
offers insufficient participatory mechanisms, it provides a solid base that can 
be modified and supplemented with improved procedural measures. In a 
more radical proposal, Robert Nelson has suggested that state legislatures 
should encourage, as an alternative to zoning, the development of “private 
neighborhood associations,” which would “own and manage the common 
elements in existing neighborhoods.”211 However, I have already noted the 
difficulties of collective action associated with private planning. 
Others have focused on common law mechanisms. Robert Ellickson has 
suggested a covenant and nuisance-based alternative to reduce the costs of 
random growth within neighborhoods.212 He has proposed that communities 
implement specific nuisance rules and “Nuisance Boards”213 to regulate and 
adjudicate nuisance questions through fact-finding hearings. These boards 
also would establish nuisance rules, damages awards, and other mechanisms 
similar to but less costly than nuisance suits.214 In a proposal related to 
Ellickson’s and Nelson’s ideas, Richard Epstein has suggested that the 
 
210.  See Arnold, supra note 187, at 3-4 (arguing that communities can use the “land use planning 
model of environmental justice”—a combination of zoning tools—to protect their 
neighborhoods).  
211.  Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal To Replace Zoning with Private 
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 879 (1999).  
212.  See Ellickson, supra note 202, at 694. 
213.  Id. at 762. 
214.  Id. at 763. 
    
searching for balance 
1557 
 
common law offers superior planning mechanisms to zoning.215 Nuisance 
suits and other common law measures, however, may not adequately address 
future concerns about the character and growth of neighborhoods. 
Participatory measures must be broader than the limited and sometimes 
costly court-based participation required of nuisance actions. Ellickson’s 
Nuisance Boards, of course, could decrease the typical costs of nuisance 
actions but may be too limited in scope for the proactive, broad-based 
community planning that I argue for in this Note. As discussed above,216 the 
common law definition of nuisance does not cover many ex ante restrictions 
on industrial development and other LULUs, because complainants cannot 
prove actual harm in advance.  
Other authors have suggested mechanisms closer to the regulatory 
balances regime that I propose. Sheila Foster, for example, has proposed a 
“deliberative model of participation in the siting process”217 and has stressed 
the need for networking and collaboration among grassroots movements.218 
Yet communities will fare better if grassroots movements can operate under a 
layered system of options for community planning that includes specific 
governmental mechanisms to address low-income land use planning needs as 
well as the inequitable burdens that may result from regulation. For positive 
land use goals, such as inclusionary zoning, some authors have suggested 
broad, comprehensive plans at the national or state level to impose fair share 
obligations on municipalities219 or to require the provision of minimum levels 
of low-income housing.220 I build upon such recommendations but suggest 
that the key needs in this area are funds targeted specifically to low-income 
neighborhoods. 
 
215.  See Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What’s Wrong with Euclid, 5 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 290-91 (1996).  
216.  See supra Subsection I.D.4. 
217.  Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the 
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 834 (1998).  
218.  See id. at 840. 
219.  See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the 
Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1573-74 (1993).  
220.  See Robert L. Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for 
Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581, 589-91 
(2003) (arguing for the benefits of Oregon’s land use planning system, which sets 
“mandatory state land use planning policies,” or goals, implemented through local zoning 
regulations—such as requiring governments to encourage affordable housing by allowing 
various densities and residences in each community). 
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B. A More Balanced Alternative  
The existing proposed alternatives or improvements to zoning fail to fully 
address the problems caused by the growing number of partial regulatory 
takings regimes and by the status quo. I identified the most substantial 
problems above as (1) insufficient opportunities for communities to 
participate in and influence the community planning process, and (2) uneven 
burdens on low-income communities caused by this dearth of meaningful 
participation as well as by insufficient alternatives to regulatory options. 
Additionally, I discussed other problems associated with the regulatory 
takings ballot initiatives in 2006, such as landowners’ inability to effectively 
address the impacts of regulatory waivers on neighboring lands; piecemeal 
land uses created by waivers; unusually low procedural barriers to claims; 
and the frequent inability of governments to exempt zoning regulations from 
takings claims. I therefore propose a three-pronged regulatory balances 
regime that offers alternative solutions.  
1. Improved Mechanisms for Participation 
As argued above, participation in planning the development and character 
of one’s community—whether through zoning or alternative mechanisms—is 
an essential component of any planning regime.221 Current zoning processes 
do not consistently permit sufficient access by low-income and minority 
participants. Zoning processes could be improved to allow all members of a 
community to participate and to give input, whether they are real estate 
developers, mobile home owners, apartment dwellers, farmers, or small 
business owners. 
a. Neighborhood Input Groups  
The State of Washington originally wrote its Growth Management Act 
(GMA) in 1990 with the goal of allowing communities to participate in the 
land use planning process and tailor the process to their unique needs.222 The 
 
221.  Cf. ARROW, supra note 8, at 89 (noting that the process by which society makes choices is 
“especially important if the mechanism of choice itself has a value to the individuals in the 
society”). 
222.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.010 (West 2003) (“It is in the public interest that 
citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate 
with one another in comprehensive land use planning.”); id. § 36.70A.020(11) (expressing 
an intention to “[e]ncourage the involvement of citizens in the planning process”). 
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Act created growth management hearing boards in 1991 to help accomplish 
these goals.223 In practice, however, the planning process has continued to be 
top-down.224 Rural communities with declining populations have tended to 
adopt the same growth management strategies as cities, such as Seattle, that 
are experiencing rapid growth.225 Residents also have complained that the 
boards largely have ignored some of the GMA’s goals, such as recognizing the 
need to support “natural resource industries” like farming.226 Bob Hart, a 
nurseryman and former county commissioner in rural Washington, has 
attributed this problem to the appointment of board members who are nearly 
exclusively focused on environmental issues.227 
For a true local planning system to emerge, neighborhood input groups 
should be formed to serve as liaisons between the public and the planning 
and zoning boards. These groups could be similar to New York City’s 
community boards, which provide an official body through which residents 
can propose zoning changes and can respond to others’ proposals.228 Unlike 
New York’s community boards, however, the input groups could be required 
to conduct public hearings for each significant proposed zoning or regulatory 
change that could substantially affect property or living conditions within the 
neighborhood. Additionally, the groups could consist of a combination of 
elected and appointed members and could have a rotating membership that 
at any given time would include representatives from various community 
interests. In Washington, for example, the board could include low-income 
residents; representatives of natural resource interests, such as farmers and 
timber businesses; real estate developers; and environmental and tribal 
interests. 
When zoning regulations are constrained by partial regulatory takings 
regimes, the neighborhood input groups should focus on planning measures 
that distribute burdens in the most equitable manner possible—regulations 
that are less “expensive” yet still accomplish community planning goals. 
These boards also could be helpful as watchdogs to ensure that governments 
do not simply waive regulations or fail to regulate.  
 
223.  See id. § 36.70A.250; Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bds., The Growth Management Act, 
http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/gma/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2007). 
224.  See Telephone Interview with Heather Hansen, supra note 112. 
225.  See id. 
226.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(8) (setting forth the goal to “[m]aintain and 
enhance natural resource-based industries, including productive timber, agricultural, and 
fisheries industries”); Telephone Interview with Bob Hart, supra note 166. 
227.  See Telephone Interview with Bob Hart, supra note 166. 
228.  See Maantay, supra note 200, at 584. 
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To address the problems created by waivers under a partial regulatory 
takings regime, the input boards could adopt a waiver policy similar to those 
created under Florida’s Bert J. Harris Act229 and Oregon’s administrative 
rules,230 requiring notice to landowners when a landowner makes a 
compensation claim on a neighboring piece of land. The input boards could 
provide a mechanism through which neighboring landowners could express 
their concerns about the activities that might emerge if the government 
waived the regulation for a claimant. The boards could encourage 
landowners to reach a compromise for partial waiver (somewhat similar to 
Florida’s modified waivers231) that would prevent local governments from 
waiving land use regulations that neighbors deemed to be particularly 
important. Additionally, the boards could solicit suggestions for land-
swapping schemes similar to those allowed in Florida. Through this method, 
a landowner making a compensation claim in a regulated conservation area, 
which would be fragmented if the government waived the regulation, could 
receive development rights for another parcel in a less regulated area.  
b. The Ombudsman “Plus”  
To further encourage community participation and to monitor the 
effectiveness of a state’s regulatory balances regime, one or several 
individuals, depending on community size,232 should hold positions similar 
to that of an ombudsman. This ombudsman “plus” would answer residents’ 
questions regarding regulatory burdens, ensure that residents and the 
government communicated when disputes arose, and facilitate arbitration if 
necessary. This officer also would oversee the town planning process to make 
sure that it operated smoothly and fairly.233  
Utah’s experience with an ombudsman has proven quite successful and 
provides a helpful model. Utah formed the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman in 1997,234 and since then the state has not seriously considered 
 
229.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(b) (West 2004).  
230.  See supra note 180. 
231.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(d)(1) (allowing agencies to implement mechanisms such as 
variances or special exceptions to laws as an alternative to full waivers). 
232.  Size is an important consideration. Cities could create several ombudsman positions to 
shrink the representative/resident ratio. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 163, at 2025-26 (discussing 
how smaller governments may promote democracy).  
233.  The ombudsman would, for example, monitor the use of community planning funds 
discussed infra Subsection III.B.2. 
234.  See David Spohr, Take a Look at This Bill. Please, 23 ENVTL. F. 21, 21 (2006). 
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any major regulatory takings measures.235 The Utah ombudsman is a 
disinterested, accessible attorney who answers questions from private 
property owners (and sometimes local agencies) about property rights 
disputes.236 Additionally, the ombudsman can assist with conciliation and 
mediation, “express a non-binding evaluation of the facts and law” 
underlying a property dispute, and force private arbitration between 
governments and property owners once property rights disputes are ripe.237 
These efforts help avoid the high legal fees and lengthy court battles that 
otherwise would ensue when property interests clashed.238 And local agencies 
often do change their actions following discussions with the property owner 
and the ombudsman. The Utah Department of Transportation, for example, 
reduced its condemnation rate by about 50% over several years as a result of 
ombudsman activity.239  
An institution providing ombudsman-like services in other states could 
similarly allow input into the planning process and help parties avoid court 
battles over regulation. In Florida, which requires property owners to 
consider settlement offers from the government agency responsible for a 
regulation before bringing a claim in court,240 parties have avoided litigation 
in some disputes.241 The proposed ombudsman under a regulatory balances 
system would provide not only advice and mediation services but also the 
monitoring services discussed above. An ombudsman alone, however, can 
prove insufficient, particularly if she lacks the authority to resolve land use 
disputes. Arizona, for example, has an advocate for property rights242 with 
 
235.  See E-mail from David Spohr, Senior Deputy Ombudsman for Rural & Unincorporated 
Affairs, Metropolitan King County Council, Wash., to author (Nov. 28, 2006, 21:08:00 
EST) (on file with author). 
236.  See Spohr, supra note 234, at 22. 
237.  Office of the Prop. Rights Ombudsman, What Can the Ombudsman’s Office Do for Me?, 
http://propertyrights.utah.gov/doforme.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
238.  See Spohr, supra note 234, at 25 (“A single court case avoided can fund dozens—if not 
hundreds—of efforts by an agency to resolve its disputes out of court.”). 
239.  See Craig M. Call, Ombudsman’s Report on Private Property (June 2003), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050902192242/http://www.utahpropertyrights.com/annual_
report.htm. 
240.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(c), (6)(a) (West 2004). 
241.  See GA. SENATE RESEARCH OFFICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
STUDY COMMITTEE 5 (2005), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/senate/ 
publications/inversecondemnation.pdf (discussing how the Bert J. Harris Private Property 
Protection Act facilitates pre-suit settlements).  
242.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1312 (2004).  
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duties somewhat similar to those of the Utah ombudsman,243 yet voters still 
overwhelmingly approved a partial regulatory takings regime in 2006. The 
Arizona advocate’s duties are much more limited than the Utah 
ombudsman’s role,244 which may partially explain the comparative success of 
the Utah ombudsman. If all else fails, litigation still might arise, but the 
ombudsman can bring parties to the table to ensure that their voices are 
heard and that they are treated “fairly, with dignity.”245 And because an 
ombudsman’s services are free,246 unlike those of the court system, they are 
accessible to all parties.247  
 The ombudsman “plus” would be particularly important in states with 
partial regulatory takings regimes. Many landowners would likely have 
questions about the validity of their claims or about methods for preparing 
claims if the government created higher procedural barriers within the claims 
process. The ombudsman could answer potential claimants’ questions and 
prevent the submission of frivolous claims, thus decreasing burdens on 
administrative agencies. Additionally, the ombudsman could assist the 
government in determining whether proposed regulations fell under a 
category exempted from regulation, thus allowing the government to identify 
less costly regulations and to better predict its future budgets.  
2. Addressing Inequities: Funds for Community Projects  
In addition to developing an ombudsman position and creating 
neighborhood input groups to ensure community participation in the 
planning process, local governments should create a mechanism—separate 
from the general tax base and managed by an elected body—to fund 
community land use measures. As discussed above, low-income 
neighborhoods in particular suffer inequities caused by limitations on zoning 
 
243.  See supra note 182.  
244.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1313(A)(2)-(3), (B)(2); Call, supra note 239.  
245.  Spohr, supra note 234, at 25.  
246.  See Office of the Prop. Rights Ombudsman, What Is an Ombudsman?, 
http://propertyrights.utah.gov/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (“There is no charge for 
consultation with an Ombudsman. We deal with property rights and land issues state-wide, 
involving any unit of state or local government.”). 
247.  Note, however, that even process-oriented laws, such as those creating an ombudsman 
position or mandating settlement negotiation before a compensation claim is filed, can have 
similar effects to the barriers created by the court system. If, for example, the laws limit 
access to the process or excessively constrain resolution options, some potential users of the 
system may face high obstacles to participation. The ombudsman “plus” position would 
therefore require careful development. See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 6.  
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under partial regulatory takings regimes because they lack the financial 
resources that would support sufficient alternatives to zoning.248 
Additionally, other communities feel disproportionately burdened by 
regulations that prevent them from using their land for income-producing 
activities, and they demand compensation as a remedy.  
The need for a community land use funding mechanism has become 
apparent in the recent debates over partial regulatory takings. In 
Washington, even opponents to Initiative 933 voiced lingering concerns 
about the burdens imposed on property owners by the GMA and its 
accompanying ordinances.249 Harvey Jacobs of the University of Wisconsin 
has suggested that while some fear that regulatory takings measures would 
“open doors to big developers,” in fact “[m]ost people sympathize with small 
landowners whose modest plans for their property have been stymied by 
growth management rules.”250 Jacobs has suggested, as a middle-ground 
option, that rural landowners be “compensated” with development credits 
when a state or local regulation restricts development on their land. The 
landowners could then sell these credits to developers who wished to increase 
density in urban areas.251 King County, Washington, already has used this 
system for some projects: developers wishing to add floors to condominiums 
in urban areas contribute to an account for the conservation of rural lands.252  
A community-based fund geared toward land use measures would 
address problems of inequity by (1) providing compensation for landowners 
severely burdened by regulations (the definition of which could be 
determined on a community-by-community basis), and (2) supporting 
infrastructure projects, preventive zoning regulations or zoning alternatives, 
and other community measures that would result from an improved planning 
process.  
Communities could use the fund to compensate owners whose property 
was clearly burdened by a new regulation pursuant to an established 
threshold value determined by the community. For example, if a community 
wished to prevent a farmer from clearing a large portion of her land for 
pasture and to preserve this uncleared portion for open space, it could use 
money from the fund to compensate her for the uncleared acreage through 
“conservation rights.” These conservation rights would resemble 
 
248.  See supra Section II.B.  
249.  See Eric Pryne, Middle Road on Property Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at B1. 
250.  Id. (quoting Jacobs). 
251.  See id. 
252.  See id. 
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development easements (development rights purchased and then taken out of 
use). But here the government simply would pay the farmer for the burden of 
regulation rather than purchase the farmer’s development rights and place 
them in a trust. Similar transferable systems of actual development rights 
could be used for developers claiming diminished property values from 
regulation. This type of transferable compensation system could provide a 
more balanced distribution of funds at lower cost than a traditional partial 
regulatory takings system.253 
 To address fairness issues for those with less property (or no real 
property of their own), a portion of the fund, such as 25% of its total value, 
should be earmarked to support projects resulting from regulations and rules 
that improve low-income areas within the community, such as affordable 
housing measures and infrastructure construction and maintenance. A 
portion of this 25% could also support mechanisms that allow low-income 
neighborhoods meaningfully to influence the LULU siting process.  
The funding base in a regulatory balances regime could come from 
mandatory contributions from developers who receive development 
“bonuses” (such as permission to build additional square footage); from 
permit application fees and other revenues of day-to-day zoning business; 
and from voluntary contributions by groups with targeted regulatory desires, 
such as land conservation interests. Additionally, in areas with partial 
regulatory takings regimes, municipalities could consider getting voter 
approval for a tax on development gains under the system—i.e., landowners 
would pay an excise, income, or property tax when they received a waiver 
after submitting a compensation claim. This would be contentious and 
complex to implement but would likely generate more revenues with which 
to implement conservation easements or similar growth management 
mechanisms in communities that have developed conservation planning 
goals.  
This type of tax system has been proposed for some municipalities in 
Oregon, where owners would be taxed for the “windfall” that occurs when a 
municipality expands an urban growth boundary, thus allowing the “full 
range of urban development” in an area formerly limited to low-density 
residential, farming, or forestry use.254 Robert Liberty has suggested that the 
 
253.  To ensure cost savings, the government would have to create a market that gave 
development rights real value. See MARTIN A. GARRETT, JR., LAND USE REGULATION: THE 
IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE LAND USE RIGHTS 84-87 (1987).  
254.  Robert Liberty, Give and Take over Measure 37: Could Metro Reconcile Compensation for 
Reductions in Value with a Regional Plan for Compact Urban Growth and Preserving Farmland?, 
36 ENVTL. L. 187, 203-04 (2006).  
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tax could support conservation easements or improve infrastructure and 
capital improvements in the urban areas created by the expansion of the 
boundary.255 The funds thus would originate from the entity that received a 
“bonus” property right rather than from the entire tax base, and they would 
be used to directly reduce the effects of development in nearby areas. 
Another method to generate funds in states with partial regulatory 
takings regimes would be a fee for takings claims. This would impose a slight 
barrier to claimants, thus preventing the danger of overwhelming 
governments with thousands of potentially frivolous claims. True, the funds 
raised through the systems proposed above would not come close to reaching 
Oregon’s approximately $15 billion in claims.256 But it would allow 
communities to avoid waiving all claims.  
Communities could also reduce claim amounts to a more manageable 
value by implementing procedural barriers in addition to a claims fee. Similar 
to Florida’s system,257 local rules could require claimants to consider a 
settlement offer from an agency and could ensure that issues were ripe prior 
to bringing a claim for compensation to a higher body, such as a court. 
Finally, communities could decrease claim numbers by expanding the 
categories of regulation exempted from compensation requirements. All of 
these mechanisms would reduce the number and value of claims to a more 
manageable amount than Oregon’s $15 billion while still allowing for funds 
to compensate both low-income communities and the residents most severely 
burdened by regulation. 
conclusion 
A regulatory balances system could provide a more reasonably priced and 
fair approach to regulatory impacts on private property. This approach would 
take into account regulatory harms and benefits to all individuals, not just the 
“propertied” class. It would allow individuals to plan the character of their 
communities, to communicate their concerns to the government, and to voice 
their belief that they had been disproportionately burdened by government 
regulation or inaction. It would encourage the government, as a result of 
these expressed concerns, to seek less burdensome alternatives. And it would 
provide a system that focused on compromise rather than on costly litigation. 
Such a regime could provide relief from the current partial regulatory takings 
 
255.  See id. at 219-20. 
256.  See supra note 12. 
257.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(5)(a)-(b) (West 2004). 
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system, which is too expensive and which poses the threat of halting some 
types of community planning in their tracks, further harming some 
communities that already face heavy burdens. 
The ombudsman approach and systems that create more “even” transfers 
of development and conservation rights provide a strong starting point for an 
effective regulatory balances regime. While an ombudsman or a regime of 
tradable development or conservation rights would require a state to hire 
several attorneys or to create an institution to monitor trades, neither would 
necessitate the massive administrative infrastructure required of a regulatory 
takings regime. And the proposed options would promote fairness by 
increasing participation while decreasing its costs. 
We have models on which to build. We also have a great need to improve 
the interaction between governments and private individuals in the realm of 
property rights, as shown by the inflammatory divides that have emerged 
alongside the growing partial regulatory takings movement. It is time for a 
renewed focus on ensuring that all residents have a voice in determining the 
future of their communities.  
